Impact of the tsunami response on local and national capacities



**Tsunami Evaluation Coalition**

# July 2006

The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) is a multi-agency learning and accountability initiative in the humanitarian sector. It was established in February 2005 in the wake of the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunamis of 26 December 2004.

The TEC is managed by a Core Management Group (CMG) of agencies and TEC staff are hosted by the ALNAP Secretariat. The CMG provides general oversight and direction for the TEC on behalf of its wider membership. Since February 2005 CMG members have included representatives from: Danida, SDC and Sida; FAO, OCHA, UNDP, UNICEF and WHO; CARE, AIDMI,the IFRC and World Vision; the ALNAP Secretariat and Groupe URD.

**The TEC has three main aims:**

1. To improve the quality of humanitarian action, including linkages to longerterm recovery and development.
2. To provide accountability to the donor and affected-country populations onthe overall tsunami response (from the point of view of TEC member agencies).
3. To test the TEC approach as a possible model for future joint evaluation.

More information on the TEC can be found in the TEC’s Synthesis Report and on the TEC’s website: www.tsunami-evaluation.org

**The TEC’s thematic evaluations**

This evaluation is one of five thematic joint evaluations undertaken by the TEC. The other four studies in the series comprise: the role of needs assessment in the tsunami response; coordination of international humanitarian assistance in tsunami-affected countries; the international funding response to the tsunami, and links between relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) in the tsunami response.

This evaluation is published alongside these other four studies together with the TEC’s Synthesis Report, making a set of six. The Synthesis Report draws together learning and recommendations contained in these TEC studies as well as over 170 additional reports.

Impact of the tsunami response on local and national capacities

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**With contributions from Tony Vaux**

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## **Management of the evaluation**

This evaluation was managed by the Strategic and Thematic Evaluation Group in UNDP, New York, and by the All India Disaster Mitigation Institute (AIDMI). It was guided by a Steering Committee consisting of representatives from ActionAid International, AIDMI, CordAid, UNDP and UNICEF.

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# Acronyms and abbreviations

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **ADB** | Asian Development Bank |
| **ADPC** | Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre, Thailand |
| **AIDMI** | All India Disaster Mitigation Institute (formerly DMI) |
| **ALNAP** | Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in  Humanitarian Action |
| **BAKORNAS** | National Disaster Management Board, Indonesia |
| **BAPPEDA** | District Planning Board, Indonesia |
| **BAPPENAS** | Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Nasional (Ministry of  Planning), Indonesia |
| **BRR** | Aceh and Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency |
| **CBO** | community-based organisation |
| **CFW** | cash for work |
| **CMG** | Core Management Group (of the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition) |
| **DAD** | Development Assistance Database |
| **DDPM** | Department for Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Thailand |
| **DEC** | Disasters Emergency Committee (UK) |
| **DMI** | Disaster Mitigation Institute (now AIDMI) |
| **DSS** | Defence Security Service |
| **EAC** | Evaluation Advisor and Coordinator (TEC) |
| **GAM** | Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement) |
| **GBV** | gender-based violence |
| **GDP** | Gross Domestic Product |
| **GHDI** | Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative |
| **HRBA** | human-rights-based approaches |
| **HRR** | Humanitarian Response Review |

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| **HQ** | Headquarters |
| **IASC** | Inter-Agency Standing Committee |
| **IAWG** | Inter-Agency Working Group |
| **IDP** | internally displaced person |
| **IFRC** | International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies |
| **ILO** | International Labour Office |
| **INGO** | international non-governmental organisation |
| **IOM** | International Organisation for Migration |
| **JICA** | Japan International Cooperation Agency |
| **LTTE** | Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam |
| **NGO** | non-governmental organisation |
| **OCHA** | Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| **OECD-DAC** | Development Cooperation Directorate, Organisation for Economic  Cooperation and Development |
| **MoU** | memorandum of understanding |
| **RADA** | Reconstruction and Development Agency (Sri Lanka) |
| **SDC** | Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation |
| **Sida** | Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency |
| **TAFOR** | Presidential Task Force for Relief (Sri Lanka) |
| **TAFREN** | Presidential Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation (Sri Lanka) |
| **TAP** | Transitional Accommodation Progress |
| **TEC** | Tsunami Evaluation Coalition |
| **TICA** | Thai International Cooperation Agency |
| **TNI** | Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Army) |
| **ToR** | terms of reference |
| **TRO** | Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation |
| **UNDAC** | UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination |
| **UNDP** | UN Development Programme |
| **UNFPA** | UN Population Fund |
| **UNHCR** | (Office of the) UN High Commissioner for Refugees |
| **UNICEF** | UN Children’s Fund |
| **UNIFEM** | UN Development Fund for Women |
| **USAID** | United States Agency for International Development |
| **WFP** | World Food Programme |
| **WHO** | World Health Organisation |

# Executive summary

## Introduction

The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) initiated five parallel evaluations of the international response to the tsunami, of which this is one. The purpose of this evaluation was to determine the impact of the tsunami response, primarily the role of international actors, on local and national capacities for relief and recovery, and risk reduction. The ToR identified the following six objectives.

* Assess how local and national capacities changed as a result of the tsunami response.
* Assess how well international actors engaged with local and national capacities in providing relief and recovery assistance.
* Assess the intended and unintended changes to local and national capacities as a result of the tsunami response by international actors.
* Assess the extent to which transition/risk reduction/recovery programming, planned and implemented, is likely to influence local and national capacities.
* Distil lessons learned for efforts to strengthen local and national capacities for future crisis response and recovery.
* Ensure that all the above assess and highlight gender differences and the varied experiences of women and men.

Fieldwork was undertaken between midSeptember and mid-November 2005 in four of the affected countries – Indonesia, Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Thailand. A team of three international consultants studied the four countries between them, with additional international assistance for the Maldives. National consultants supported the process in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand while staff from the Care Society supported the study in the Maldives. Structured surveys of claim-holder views were conducted in Aceh (Indonesia) and Sri Lanka.

For the purpose of this evaluation, the term ‘capacities’ has been taken in a broad sense, i.e., to mean much more than technical skills, also encompassing the ability to access services and programmes, to influence and set policies and longerterm recovery and reconstruction agendas, and to open and use the space to hold duty-bearers at all levels accountable. It includes the processes by which these outcomes are achieved, notably participation, consultation and information sharing. The evaluation does not attempt to evaluate the performance of specific agencies but to focus on the overall impact and draw lessons from the response taken as a whole. The Team recognises that there is wide variety in performance and that there are many examples that may be exceptions to the general trends observed.

## National and local capacities

At the national level, Thailand was successful in managing the response, drawing on well-prepared structures and plans. In Indonesia and Sri Lanka the response was marred by lack of coordination between government entities, while in the Maldives there was a quick and effective initial response, but then some lack of representation of outlying communities. In all four countries such tendencies toward over-centralised control caused difficulties in relation to the local administration. National capacities for future disaster preparedness have been strengthened by the international agencies, especially in Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Thailand. In Indonesia the state has initiated important developments in national policy and capacity, which are yet to be proven. Across the region, the international community played a useful role in raising states’ awareness about the rights and entitlements of internally displaced persons, although not always with the desired results. But the interaction of local and national government remains problematic.

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The results are less positive at the community level. The evaluation finds that local ownership of the tsunami response was undermined and some local capacities were rendered more vulnerable by the response to the disaster. The Sri Lanka survey indicates that although there was a generally positive rating for the response initially, this declined over time. The problem relating to capacities is demonstrated by the finding that only about 20 per cent of claim-holders were satisfied with the way in which their skills were used, while nearly half found this engagement somewhat unsatisfactory or worse.

The surveys also indicate perceptions of lack of fairness in the response. Womenheaded and poorer households were most disadvantaged while those who were more articulate received greater benefits. This tendency seems to have increased gradually. Aid was provided to marginal groups during the relief phase but, being less informed and organised about their rights and less able to access common services, they were overlooked in the recovery and reconstruction phases. Their special needs and constraints required a more proactive and strategic response.

Women registered a lower level of satisfaction with the general response than men (in Sri Lanka, at least). This may reflect a lack of attention in the response to issues of protection. There are some notable successes in this field but generally international agencies did less than they should to protect women. The most vulnerable were those who were marginalised by several different factors at once, especially conflict, and also women in camps. Women with few assets before the tsunami tended to receive less in compensation than men who already had many assets. This is particularly true in the case of livelihood support.

Underlying the problems at community level is a lack of engagement at the earliest stage with community-based and local nongovernmental organisations (CBOs and NGOs). Many of these had played a major role during the search-and-rescue phase

**Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities**

but were marginalised during the relief process; relations had become strained, or capacities weakened, by the time that agencies sought their cooperation in the recovery phase.

One of the most successful aspects of the response was the use of cash transfers, allowing communities and individuals a greater degree of choice than with distribution of materials. In the Aceh survey, 90 per cent of those surveyed felt that cash was better than food or other relief items. Among Sri Lankan respondents the majority (53 per cent) preferred cash to goods, which was supported by another 12 per cent who felt that cash would enable them to buy what they wanted.

## Issues in the international response

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Specific aspects of the response that have undermined local capacity include ‘poaching’ of staff from other organisations, especially local NGOs, and burdensome requirements for reporting. There was too much emphasis on speed and profile, leading to unnecessary and wasteful use of expatriate staff, many of whom had little relevant experience and were at a particular disadvantage in addressing the highly complex social structures of communities in the region. Structurally, this reflects an underestimation of local capacities, which were generally coping with most of the immediate problems. The findings in all four countries show that most of the lifesaving activity was conducted by local communities before the arrival of national and international assistance. They needed support to continue into the recovery stage.

These early mistakes in developing supportive relationships compromised the effectiveness and efficiency of international assistance in the long term. By behaving as if they were saving lives long after that phase of the response was over, international agencies undermined recognition for local capacities and made long-term recovery more difficult. It is hard to find the right balance between delivering immediate relief and engaging with local capacities, but in this case the international agencies were unduly impetuous, possibly because of exceptional pressures to spend money rapidly.

## Conclusions

Capacity cannot be separated from issues of power. A society that effectively manages its own issues of inequality and marginalisation is likely to be able to cope well with disasters. Local capacity is not just a means for delivering relief but has a long-term role in disaster mitigation. But this is not a simple matter; in many of the countries there were serious problems of social division and even conflict. Building capacity in such societies is not simply about supporting institutional structures but is a more complex political process involving the empowerment of poorer and more excluded people so that when disaster strikes they have a valid claim on their community, local officials and national government.

From this perspective the tsunami response must be assessed not only in terms of delivery of goods and services but also in terms of whether it supported local capacities, especially among the most marginalised groups. But this was not always recorded and too often the social effects of aid are unknown even to the agencies that caused them. Capacity strengthening should be better recognised as an issue in itself. The importance of a capacity strengthening type of engagement is that it represents a more sustainable approach to disaster response. Its benefits come from the longterm impact of mitigating and preventing disaster as well as from addressing immediate needs.

The importance of capacity strengthening is recognised in the guiding principles for humanitarian response, although not clearly enough linked to disaster mitigation. This evaluation highlights the disparity between the stated policies of international humanitarian actors and the operational realities in terms of direct execution, engagement with local capacity and community participation. When the aid system is under pressure in crisis situations, the imperative to deliver services is dominant – the tsunami response being perhaps an extreme example.

Inevitably, there is strong pressure for ‘results’ from the headquarters of international agencies. But even among field staff there is a general tendency to underestimate local capacity and give excessive importance to the delivery of external assistance. This is a process that re-confirms itself. By ignoring local capacity, the role of external aid is made to seem all the more important. The more external aid there is, the more that local capacity is undermined. The hitch is that, having started off in such a way, relationships and strategies then fail to develop more positively during the recovery phase. The response stalls at around the six-month mark, as it did in the case of the tsunami disaster.

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There is a need to rethink the end goal of humanitarian assistance and move from a service delivery approach to a capacity empowering framework, or in other words to shift the emphasis from delivery to support and facilitation.

## Key messages

The evaluation team identified three key areas for the attention of international actors. All of them relate to existing international standards but on the basis of this evaluation appear to be areas in which the tsunami response has been weak in practice.

* **Engagement with local and**

**national capacities.** This includes the ability to recognise and identify local capacities and the need to include local communities in planning and decision-making through participation and consultation, and commitment to devolve decision-making as far as possible.

* **Attention to social inequalities, exclusion and hierarchies.** Capacity should be defined in relation to not only skills and training but also the empowerment of poorer and marginalised groups. The capacity of a community to resist disaster is sensitive to this. It includes not simply the identification of such groups but ensuring that particularly their voices are heard in decision-making.
* **Contribution to an enabling environment and context.** Marginalised groups need to improve their position in relation to communities, and communities in relation to district and national authorities. The basis for this process is empowerment through the strategic management of information, and strengthening downward accountability. Advocacy is also an important element but should be based on enhanced local capacities rather than external interventions.

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## Recommendations

For recommendations on specific countries, please refer to the individual report summaries presented in the Annexes. The key messages above translate into the following general recommendations for international agencies.

*Overarching recommendation*

Sector-wide discussions at the global level should be initiated to address the need for a fundamental re-orientation of the humanitarian sector based on the principle that the ownership of humanitarian assistance should rest with claim-holders. This implies a shift of emphasis from delivery to support and facilitation. Such discussions are expected to facilitate implementation of the following recommendations.

*Recommendation 1: Engagement with local and national capacities*

* International agencies should prepare in advance for the problems of scaling up not simply by identifying resources but also by making their systems and practices suitable for maximum participation by local people and national governments.
* They should make plans to shift into more collective ways of working during ‘mega-disasters’ in order to ensure that they do not extend beyond their competence but instead link with others and share roles.
* They should have clear partnership strategies and develop local partnerships from the start in order to achieve a smooth transition from relief to recovery.

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* They should institute procedures for making grants for longer time periods even from the outset of an intervention, and should critically examine their reporting requirements to ensure that they do not discriminate against CBOs.
* Specific agreements and protocols should be made to prevent ‘poaching’ of staff, to ensure local capacity is not undermined.

*Recommendation 2: Attention to social inequalities, exclusion and hierarchies*

* Strategies should be developed to ensure that women and marginalised groups have full access to information.
* Women claim-holders should be represented in all decision-making bodies affecting them.
* Planning should be based on the assumption that aid is likely to reinforce inequalities within the community unless corrective action is taken.
* Planning should also take account of the complexity of community structures and the consequent need for knowledgeable local intermediaries with power to influence decisions.
* Inclusion of the most marginalised people should be treated as a fundamental principle or right, regardless of costs.
* Aid should be given according to need rather than being limited to a particular disaster – in the case of the tsunami, people affected by conflict should be included in aid responses.

*Recommendation 3: Contribution to an enabling environment and context*

* Communities should be encouraged to develop their own contingency plans for disasters and receive material support on the basis that adequate provision must be made for poorer and marginalised groups. This should

extend to a wide range of civil-society organisations including women’s

groups.

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* National governments in disasterprone countries should develop comprehensive plans and procedures for disaster management, including the management of information in

order to ensure that communities are

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
kept fully informed at all stages of the response.

* They should also make plans not only for the establishment of a central body to manage disaster responses but also to enable cooperation between departments and between the centre and local government.

Those responding to a disaster should ensure that full information about their activities is available to all those affected, especially in local communities. This might include public notices giving financial information, and public audits.

Agencies should strengthen watchdog movements and support the mass media to promote downward accountability through better understanding of the response and opportunities for feedback and dialogue.

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Countries affected by the tsunami

**Chapter one1**

# Introduction

## 1.1 Background

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On 26 December 2004, shifting tectonic plates in the Indian Ocean caused an earthquake measuring 9.0 on the Richter scale. Within minutes, waves of up to 12 metres hit coastal communities along the west coast of northern Sumatra. The massive upward movement in the seabed also caused tsunamis to strike coastal communities in parts of western Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, eastern India and the Maldives before reaching the coast of Africa. The tsunami triggered an unprecedented global public response in the form of donations and concern which, in turn, provided a unique opportunity for the humanitarian community to demonstrate how effectively, efficiently, equitably and sustainably it could serve affected populations without the usual financial constraints.

With this unique opportunity came a heightened responsibility to account for the quality of the tsunami response. To this end, the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), a collective of bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, NGOs and concerned institutions, initiated five parallel evaluations of the international tsunami response, including this study on local and national capacities. Each evaluation will provide lessons for strengthening ongoing activities and future responses to emergencies. In addition, all five evaluations will produce learning on the process of undertaking joint but parallel multi-agency evaluations within a larger coalition. Specific evaluations take account of the fact that others may focus in greater depth on certain issues and therefore give those issues rather less attention. In the case of the current study, for example, needs assessments are not considered in depth because they are the subject of another TEC evaluation.

## 1.2 The capacities evaluation

The current evaluation was managed by the Strategic and Thematic Evaluation Group in UNDP, New York, and the All India Disaster Mitigation Institute (AIDMI), and guided by a Steering Committee consisting of representatives of ActionAid International, AIDMI, CordAid, UNDP and UNICEF, and quality assured by a wider working group.

There were three core members of the evaluation team. Arjuna Parakrama, overall team leader, was responsible for the inception report, leading the Sri Lanka field study and for the claim-holder surveys. He is the primary author of the Sri Lanka country report and contributed to the Indonesia country report. Elisabeth Scheper was team leader for the Indonesia and Thailand field studies and participated in the Sri Lanka field study. She is the primary author of the Thailand and Indonesia country reports and contributed to the Sri Lanka country report. Smruti Patel conducted the desk reviews and literature surveys for all countries. She was team leader for the Maldives study and participated in the Indonesia and Thailand field studies, contributing to those reports. She is the primary author of the Maldives country report. All team members contributed to this regional report.

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The evaluation process was supported by Janey Lawry White (UNDP consultant), who was a team member for the Maldives field study, contributed to the Maldives country report, and provided project management throughout. National consultants were recruited in Indonesia (Abdur Rofi and Ms Arabiyani, a UNIFEM programme officer who assisted with interviews with women’s groups in Aceh) and Sri Lanka (Sudarshana Gunawardana). In Thailand, local UNDP consultants assisted the team, and in the Maldives, staff from a local NGO, the Care Society, arranged and accompanied the field trips, and facilitated community and island level discussions. The final text was edited by Tony Vaux, an independent consultant who was team leader of the DEC evaluation of the tsunami response. Tony Vaux also provided quality assurance inputs, notably to increase compliance with the ALNAP Quality Proforma and TEC requirements.

## 1.3 Purpose and method

The purpose of this evaluation is to determine the impact of the tsunami response, primarily the role of international actors, on local and national capacities for relief and recovery, and risk reduction (see Annex 1, Terms of Reference, for more details). It is envisaged that the evaluation will provide lessons that serve to strengthen ongoing activities and future responses, and also hold international actors accountable to their donors and, if possible, to beneficiaries. The following six objectives are identified in the Terms of Reference (ToR).

* Assess how local and national capacities changed as a result of the tsunami response.
* Assess how well international actors engaged with local and national capacities in providing relief and recovery assistance.

**Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities**

* Assess the intended and unintended changes to local and national capacities as a result of the tsunami response by international actors.
* Assess the extent to which transition/risk reduction/recovery programming, planned and implemented, is likely to influence local and national capacities.
* Distil lessons learned for efforts to strengthen local and national capacities for future crisis response and recovery.
* Ensure that all the above assess and highlight gender differences and the varied experiences of women and men.

The ToR emphasise the need to distinguish between different phases of the response. The team used three notional phases: immediate emergency, early recovery phase, and transition from recovery to development. But there is considerable overlap between these phases and considerable variation between sectors, locations and contexts.

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Fieldwork was undertaken between mid-September and mid-November 2005 in four of the affected countries, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Thailand. These were selected to illustrate a cross-section of situations reflecting factors including: extent of tsunami damage and reconstruction needs; the response capacity with regard to state as well as civil-society capacity; the level of international support; and the local context, including pre-existing conflicts, linked to addressing capacity needs and availability of evaluative evidence. Summaries of the separate reports on the four case-study countries are attached as annexes to this report (Annexes 2–5) and the full reports are available separately. The absence of India perhaps needs some explanation. Both Thailand and India were cautious in their response to international humanitarian assistance, asking only for technical help. Of these two cases, Thailand was selected for this study for practical reasons.

For the purposes of this evaluation, the term ‘capacities’ is understood as the interconnected set of skills and abilities to access services and programmes, to influence and set policies and longer-term recovery/reconstruction agendas, and to open and use the space to hold duty-bearers at all levels accountable, and will include the continuing processes through which these outcomes are achieved. The assessment of changes in capacity requires a level of nuance and a depth of analysis that differ substantively from evaluations of general efficiency and timeliness of response. Capacity is the bridge between immediate responses and longer-term sustainability. Capacity is not just related to technical skills but also to context: the issues are played out within a complex political economy mediated by unequal power relations.

The importance of capacities is widely recognised in international principles relating to disaster response, but there is considerable variation in interpreting the term and in defining responsibilities. This evaluation provided an opportunity to explore this and will hopefully lead toward a better understanding. In the concluding sections below we examine the response to the tsunami disaster against international principles and consider the relationship of participation, consultation, capacity building and rights.

**Box 1.1 Capacities in humanitarian standards**

We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities... All people and communities – even in disaster – possess capacities as well as vulnerabilities. Where possible, we will strengthen these capacities by employing local staff, purchasing local materials and trading with local companies. (IFRC, 1994)

Disaster-affected populations must not be seen as helpless victims, and this includes members of vulnerable groups. They possess, and acquire skills and capacities and have structures to cope with and respond to a disaster situation that need to be recognised and supported. (Sphere, 2004)

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The ToR required the team to consider capacities at all levels – national, provincial, district, community and sub-community. This was done by dialogue with a wide range of stakeholders. Full lists of interviewees are included in the individual country reports, and Table 1.1[[1]](#footnote-1)[[2]](#footnote-2) provides a summary.

**Location**

2

**Bilateral**

**Government,**

**Local and national**

**INGOs & Red**

**UN**

**Government,**

**national level**

**(**

**sub-) district level**

**Cross/Crescent**

**NGOs**

3

7

35

13

18

Indonesia

25

7

7

1

10

2

0

Group meetings

23

10

25

25

123

40

78

Sri Lanka

16

Maldives

3

9

11

22

8

14

12

Thailand

0

14

6

5

176

Totals

30

140

55

121

46

**Table 1.1 Distribution of meetings and discussions in the evaluation process**

The evaluation team focused on capacities at the community level because these capacities are often excluded from evaluations of humanitarian response and recovery. Assessment of capacity at national and provincial/district levels is easier and less time-consuming due to the greater accessibility, ease of articulation and resources available. Based on feedback received from a preliminary desk review[[3]](#footnote-3) and meetings, a list of issues was drawn up by the team as a guide for further analysis and a schedule of field visits planned. In keeping with the ToR and both HQ and in-country discussions, the country studies have a twin sectoral and cross-cutting thematic focus. These were selected by stakeholder consensus. The three sectors are:

1. shelter (initial camps, temporary shelters and permanent housing)
2. livelihoods

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1. psychosocial support.

The six themes are:

1. land ownership, displacement and resettlement
2. ‘protection’ of women (and children) and women’s empowerment
3. multiple-marginalised and vulnerable groups, including the sick and elderly
4. (migrant) labour
5. strengthening local civil-society structures and downward accountability
6. national risk reduction and disaster preparedness plans (with local and media components).

### 1.3.1 Beneficiary/claim-holder surveys

In Aceh (Indonesia) and Sri Lanka, claim-holder surveys were conducted using a questionnaire in the local language to collect both quantitative and qualitative feedback from a random sample of the affected population in the worst-hit districts.

Questions focused on:

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* the relationship between efficiency and speed of delivery and enhancement of local capacity
* the process of consultation
* modalities for ensuring that community hierarchies and elites do not capture the benefits of the response.

The Aceh survey was a disappointing experience and much of the data has been lost. What remains is presented in Annex 6. A summary of the Sri Lanka survey is presented as Annex 7. The distribution of interviews in both surveys is summarised in Table 1.2.

Evaluation findings were therefore based on field studies corroborated by a desk review of secondary documents, as well as claim-holder surveys. Drafts of the country reports were updated following comments by the steering committee and working groups, stakeholders and the wider TEC membership. These near-final reports were then validated by stakeholders at exit stakeholder workshops in case study countries (except Thailand).

### 1.3.2 Biases and constraints

The relevant background of the team members is as follows.

**Professor Arjuna Parakrama** currently teaches cultural studies and discourse analysis at the University of Peradeniya in Sri Lanka. He has worked for the past 14 years as a consultant in the community development sector, specialising in capacity strengthening and working on conflict, notably with Oxfam Australia, and has been UNDP Peace & Development Advisor in Nepal. He has participated in evaluations of UNDP programmes in the Philippines, Macedonia, Sri Lanka and Indonesia.

**Table 1.2 Numbers of claim-holders and areas of claim-holders surveyed**

**Country and districts**

**Number of interviews**

**Location level and details of interviewees**

**Indonesia**

Banda Aceh

246

250

Pidi

257

Aceh Jaya

247

Aceh Besar

**Sri Lanka**

263

Batticaloa

5

50

Jaffna

Amparai

206

Trincomalee

194

142

Matara

126

Galle

174

Hambantota

**2,155**

**Total**

**6**

Sub-district and sub-village claim-holders of different categories

Sub-district and sub-village claim-holders of different categories,

including multiple-marginalised (including women, children, the

aged) and most vulnerable sub-groups

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**Elisabeth Scheper** headed the East and South East Asia Bureau of Novib

(Oxfam Netherlands), covering the four countries in this evaluation. Since June 2005 she has been evaluating UNDP programmes for the Bureau of Conflict Prevention and Recovery and the Evaluation Office.

**Smruti Patel** is an independent consultant without any current association with the agencies being evaluated. She has carried out reviews of field programmes, organisational capacity and community-based action. She has managed field programmes in Thailand, Chechnya, Afghanistan and India, working for both international and national NGOs. Her main focus is on disaster-risk management.

The main overall constraint of the evaluation was lack of time in the field. The three-month timeframe for the study of four countries was short, and, because of ill health within the team, plans had to be further curtailed. In particular, the time for fieldwork in the Maldives and Thailand evaluations had to be reduced to 10 days for each, considerably shorter than originally planned. There were also a number of contextual constraints such as the month of Ramadan. Otherwise, the team received support and active participation from all categories of stakeholders. They were generous with their time and expertise in a context of heavy workloads, looming deadlines and evaluation-fatigue. The team gratefully acknowledges the contribution of national and local government officers, bilateral and multilateral donors, and especially the affected communities, and emphasizes that any omissions and errors remain their responsibility.

1. This includes 100 respondents from Vaharai and Thirayamadu, where a special impact study wasconducted.
2. While it was planned that 200 families would be interviewed from each district in Sri Lanka, theactual numbers varied considerably as indicated in the final count contained in this table.

**Chapter two2**

# Impact of the disaster on national capacities

This section examines capacities before the disaster and its immediate impact on each of the four countries.

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## 2.1 Capacities before the tsunami disaster

### 2.1.1 Indonesia

The National Disaster Management Board (BAKORNAS) had an ad hoc disaster management structure in place, with special boards at provincial and district levels, but no contingency plans. The protracted conflict between the government and the armed separation movement (GAM) in Aceh and prolonged periods of martial law had reduced the capacity of provincial authorities. Combined with restrictions on the media and civil society, this had undermined public confidence in the government. But at the time of the tsunami, there were already moves toward peace. The Aceh Social Reconstruction Agenda, a cross-sector initiative between government and civil society, had just commenced, and most of the people displaced by the conflict had returned home (leaving 1,800 of the 130,000 originally in camps (Global IDP, 2005)). Aceh is one of Indonesia’s poorest provinces[[4]](#footnote-4), despite the offshore oil and gas exploitation, with an economy based on rural subsistence farming and fishing. Informal community groups related to mosques helped to build local self-sufficiency. Nias Island in Sumatra is one of the least developed areas of the country. It has suffered long-term neglect, compounded by geographical isolation and economic and political marginalisation of the island and its predominantly Christian inhabitants.

Due to the conflict and resulting inaccessibility, very few international agencies were present immediately before the tsunami. Some had previously worked in Aceh, withdrawing with the re-imposition of martial law in 2003. A limited number of local NGOs existed but were focused mainly on advocacy and human rights.

Effective NGOs were likely to be targeted by both the security forces and GAM.

Women in the east and central parts of Aceh suffered greatly from the conflict.

### 2.1.2 Maldives

The Maldives is a country of 1,200 islands. Economic development over the last decades has been based primarily on international tourism but this is not well integrated into the local economy and brings little benefit to local communities. There has been real progress in terms of human development indicators but, at the same time, growing disparities between the dispersed island populations. The combination of a relatively small, young population and a lack of tertiary education has contributed to out-migration and a shortage of skilled local capacity.

Almost everything, from basic food items to skilled labour, is imported.

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There is a strongly centralised form of governance. In the past three years there have been political protests over human-rights abuses. In response, the government has initiated a process of political reforms, including legalising opposition parties, but public opinion remains sceptical. Women are not subject to restrictions of public movement but, especially on the islands, face cultural constraints in leadership and employment, low participation in decision-making (there are fewer than 5 per cent women in parliament) and wide public acceptance of gender-based violence.[[5]](#footnote-5) At the time of the disaster, there was only a very limited number of national NGOs, partly because of legal difficulties. Until recently NGOs were registered under the same legislation as opposition parties.

Five UN agencies were working in the Maldives before the tsunami, with a total programme budget of around $20 million per annum. Neither UN employees, nor those of the national NGOs, had any experience of humanitarian response. There is a network of NGOs and CBOs working together, not only in service delivery but on community mobilisation and advocacy issues. Some of these organisations have experience with marginalised groups, squatter settlements and land dispute issues.

### 2.1.3 Sri Lanka

Two decades of conflict in Sri Lanka have seriously challenged capacities of both state and non-state actors in the east and north, while strengthening certain capacities (e.g. psychosocial response, coping mechanisms to face humanitarian crises). Violence has continued despite a ceasefire agreement in 2002, and increased when a LTTE breakaway faction formed in the east. There are a high number of female-headed households in conflict zones. International agencies have been involved in conflict-related relief and development work in Sri Lanka for many years. Coordination mechanisms existed within government, within the UN, among NGOs and among these three major organisational sectors but there was no national disaster management plan or structure in place before the tsunami.

### 2.1.4 Thailand

Thailand is a middle-income country with a strong central government. After several natural disasters, notably floods, landslides and typhoons, the Thai government established the Department for Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM) in the Interior Ministry in 2002 and was developing a national emergency plan with the help of the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre. The introduction of powerful ‘CEO governors’ in the provinces, with ambitious economic targets to meet, weakened the capacity of district and traditional authorities.

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The nascent conflict between the state and marginal Muslim communities in the south presented potential for violence, although not in the six Thai Andaman coast provinces affected by the tsunami. These are characterised by international tourism, economic boom-towns and poor fishing communities. Large numbers of economic migrants from the northeast, and unregistered Burmese workers, have moved into the area to work in the construction and tourism industries. This has increased the pressures on land and resulted in further marginalisation of indigenous people (notably the ‘sea gypsies’) and Muslim fisherfolk. Despite improvements in educational status, women lagged behind in wages, job opportunities and political participation (in the 2001 national elections, only 10 per cent of the candidates were women). Violence against women has continued to rise. Religious leaders and school teachers play an important role in community representation, but the local NGO sector is relatively undeveloped and is largely limited to service delivery.

## 2.2 Impact of the tsunami disaster

Differences between the four countries are shown in Table 2.1 (page 24).

### 2.2.1 Indonesia

Some 4 per cent of the population of Aceh province was killed in the tsunami. An estimated 60 senior leaders of civil society (interview with the director of Transparency International Indonesia), 5,200 staff from local authorities and 3,000 civil servants died and another 2,275 were reported missing (BAPENAS, 2005). Despite the scale of the disaster and loss of government leadership, communities coped effectively on their own in the first days after the disaster. Survivors sought refuge at higher altitudes and lived on fruits and coconuts in Aceh Jaya, or were taken in by family and neighbours in urban settings in Aceh Besar. Depending on the proximity to the capital and the scale of the destruction, it took aid workers between one day (for Banda Aceh) and ten days (for Krueng Sabee) to reach the affected communities. The Indonesian Marines provided immediate response to

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| **Table 2.1 Overview of tsunami damage in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand and the Maldives** | | | |  |  |
| **Impact of tsunami**[[6]](#footnote-6) | **Indonesia** | **Sri Lanka** | **Thailand** | **Maldives** |
| Population loss[[7]](#footnote-7) (% of national population) | 166,364 (0.1%) | 35,262 (0.2%) | 8,240 Less | 108 Less than |
|  |  |  | than (0.1%) | (0.1%)[[8]](#footnote-8) |  |
| Displaced people[[9]](#footnote-9) (% of national population) | 566,898 (0.3%) | 519,063 (2.7%) | —- | 21,663 (7.3%) |  |
| Total cost of damage (US$ million) | 4,451m | 1,454m | 2,198m | 603m |  |
|  | (2% of GDP) | (7.6% of GDP) | (1.4% of GDP) | (83.6% GDP) |  |
| Private/public (%) | 71.2/28.8 | 72.9/27.1 | 97.2/2.8 | 62.1/37.9 |  |
| Housing damage (% of total) | 31.4% | 28.3% | 1.0% | 15.6% |  |
| Physical infrastructure (% of total) | 14.3% | 18.8% | 1.2% | 20.4% |  |
| Social sectors (% of total) | 6.2% | 5.7% | 0.4% | 5.4% |  |
| Productive sectors (% of total) | 7.9% | 25.0% | 20.5% | 21.1% |  |
| Impact on worst-affected province  (cost as % of GDP) | 97.0% | 90.0% | 8.0% | 84.0%[[10]](#footnote-10) |  |

remote Aceh Jaya district, which was cut off by road, while Special Operations and TNI (Indonesian Army) reached Banda Aceh by road.

The December tsunami was relatively mild on Nias island (resulting in 122 dead,

18 missing, and 2,300 people displaced). But on 28 March 2005 an earthquake left

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839 people dead and over 6,279 injured; it also caused widespread fear, with 10,000–20,000 people leaving the island. Some 70,000 people were directly affected and the rest of the population was indirectly affected. The earthquake damaged homes, schools and places of worship, as well as roads, piers, bridges, health facilities and other government buildings, crippling the local infrastructure and administration and further undermining already weak local capacities.

### 2.2.2 Maldives

In the Maldives, there were 83 deaths and 25 missing, believed dead. Over 21,000 people were displaced and the cost of damage from the tsunami is estimated to be equivalent to 83.6 per cent of GDP. The remoteness and isolation of some of the worst-affected areas made it difficult to bring in help from outside, but local communities were quick to respond to the immediate needs of those displaced. Communities backed by island and atoll authorities used boats to rescue people from islands that were no longer habitable, housing them with host families or in community buildings. Affected families on islands where there was partial damage were similarly re-housed. Food was provided from local shops until external help arrived three to five days after the disaster.

### 2.2.3 Sri Lanka

The damage in Sri Lanka was not as intense as in Aceh, but the disaster caused a wider impact on the regional administration and national economy. With over 2.7 per cent of the population displaced and the loss of 7.6 per cent of GDP, it faced major challenges in providing the necessary assistance. Neighbouring communities assisted in the rescue and relief operations on the first day, and relief supplies and services started arriving from all parts of the country on the following day. This immediate assistance cut across religious, ethnic/cultural and political boundaries, and within affected-communities people helped each other in a number of ways. This was unprecedented in the context of mutual distrust and sectarianism that had arisen during two decades of civil war.

### 2.2.4 Thailand

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In Thailand, the impact was highly localised but the deaths of over 3,330 foreign tourists meant that the impact in Thailand was the most highly publicised in Western countries. Most fatalities occurred in three places – Kaolak/Ban Nam Khem, Ban Ne Rhai and in Krabi Bay (Koh Pipi). Buddhist monasteries were used as morgues with search-and-rescue teams augmented by the many Thai volunteers who provided personal support, money and supplies. The Thai Red Cross immediately established four relief centres and used support from the Thai Air Forces to transport supplies and personnel. Families whose houses had been destroyed were evacuated to camps where emergency shelter, food and health services were provided.

## 2.3 National responses

In all four case-study countries, the tsunami response was carried out in the context of strongly centralised systems of governance with elements of unrest and violence among the population. In Aceh, before the disaster, the government had stringently controlled the presence of international NGOs and UN agencies. Similarly in Sri Lanka, the government kept tight control over the activities of international NGOs. In Thailand, government control is also tight. There was no history of conflict in the affected areas but the influx of Burmese refugees had created the potential for violence. In the Maldives, tensions between IDPs and host communities have caused some episodes of violence.

Military forces played a significant role in the immediate response in all the countries, especially in Indonesia. In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami, the Sri Lankan Government re-introduced Emergency Regulations, which increased the military role in the relief phase. The armed forces of 43 nations assisted in the first phase of the relief operations. In the Maldives, national and international armed forces provided assistance. The National Security Services distributed relief through island authorities assisted by the Indian, Bangladeshi and Pakistani Navies. The British Navy also helped with restoring electricity and communications. The US Navy played a key role in the supply of drinking water to the more remote islands (with ship-borne reverse-osmosis plants producing potable water). In Thailand, the forces played key roles in the initial search-andrescue efforts and assisted in building both temporary shelters and permanent houses for affected communities. In terms of government structures to address the disaster, there was considerable variation.

### 2.3.1 Indonesia

In Indonesia, the pre-tsunami National Disaster Management Coordinating Board had not been set up to deal with a calamity on this scale and, in the event, was not given the major responsibility. The National Development Planning Agency played a lead role in drawing up a master-plan for reconstruction, but the greatest responsibility was given to the newly created Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR). At the provincial level, BRR coordinated responses and reconstruction with direct authority from the president. There was some tension between this body and other central ministries, as well as with the Acehnese provincial and district administrative structures.

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Because of years of conflict, the Indonesian armed forces had formerly taken a dominant role in Aceh. The local administration had become weak, corrupt and out of touch with the Acehnese population. The tsunami disaster severely damaged public infrastructure in Aceh and decimated the local administration, so that the central government had to deploy significant numbers of civil servants from elsewhere. In August 2005 the peace agreement between the government and GAM created an opportunity to rebuild a responsible, responsive and accountable local administration. But the degree of local autonomy remains a sensitive issue. Indonesia’s overall decentralisation policy focusing on the districts creates the apprehension that the provincial level is less empowered. Some commentators believe that under the special provisions for Aceh only a strong provincial administration can be an effective counter-balance to the central government. In terms of the wider political dynamics, the fact that the tsunami response and the set-up of BRR largely bypass the provincial level is problematic in terms of such perceptions.

### 2.3.2 Maldives

In the Maldives, disaster preparedness before the tsunami was focused on rising seawaters as a result of global warming, with no preparation for sudden-onset and sudden-impact disasters. Despite this lack of previous experience, the government immediately established an ad hoc Ministerial Task Force that, in turn, set up a National Disaster Management Centre (NDMC) to coordinate the immediate relief. The NDMC worked well in the first few weeks with staff drafted in from other ministries. International funding for recovery and reconstruction was channelled through the newly established Tsunami Relief and Reconstruction Fund.

### 2.3.3 Sri Lanka

In Sri Lanka, the Task Force to Rebuild the Nation (TAFREN, now reconstituted as RADA) was created in response to the disaster to take overall charge of coordinating the response, and its mandate has now been extended. But longstanding government departments retained the responsibility for specific functions. The Survey Department, for example, remains in charge of drawing and approving all site plans. Moreover, there are other new government agencies responsible for specific aspects of the response, such as Transitional Accommodation Progress (TAP) for transitional shelter. There has been a notable centralisation of functions, but there is still no overarching policy framework within which all the actors must operate. Sri Lanka’s long years of debate about devolution have not translated into effective results. While the district secretaries have the greatest operational responsibility in practice, several of them expressed frustration at the high degree of centralisation and the confusing array of statistics, policy directives and decisions coming from the central authorities.

This has resulted in a shifting and piecemeal approach, as in the case of the Coastal Buffer Zone. Originally, the area of exclusion was 400m from the coast but this later came down to 100m, and a number of exceptions have been allowed.

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Uncertainties have led to doubts about the real influences on government: people’s commissions and advocacy groups have asserted that the government and private sector are using the tsunami response to promote a Western-style modernisation agenda, replacing ad hoc and ‘illegal’ structures along the coast with commercial constructions.

### 2.3.4 Thailand

The Civil Defence Act allowed senior government staff to be deployed to disaster areas and ensured immediate release of the necessary budgets. It also established the roles of different line ministries under the central coordination of the Interior Ministry. The Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation and Civil Defence Committee set up international and domestic call centres to handle information both about the disaster and about donations. The Ad Hoc Tsunami Disaster Task Force (under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) initially coordinated foreign assistance and then this passed to the Thai International Cooperation Agency (TICA), also under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Thai government through TICA requested international technical assistance in only three priority areas-alternative livelihoods, donor coordination and disaster preparedness.

## 2.4 Conclusions

Conflict has been a major factor in both Indonesia and Sri Lanka but with some differences. In Aceh, the government has asserted a strong presence and been able to reduce the role of the military. In Sri Lanka there is still dual control. In the north the government has retained a skeleton administration but real authority lies with the LTTE. In the east the situation is more fluid, with the government, LTTE and a breakaway group of the LTTE all vying for influence and control. In Aceh the conflict was has not been an impediment in the tsunami response. By contrast, in Sri Lanka, although a ceasefire has been in place since February 2002, no formal agreement could be reached between the government and the LTTE about assistance to people in the tsunami-affected areas controlled by the LTTE. This has soured the atmosphere, and may have contributed to increasing pressures on the ceasefire in late 2005.

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No country is likely to be fully prepared for a sudden-onset disaster of the scale of this tsunami, but the Thai legal and institutional systems seem to have provided the firmest foundation. The legal and institutional mechanisms that existed in Indonesia left gaps and ambiguities, and did not include any meaningful contingency fund or strategy in relation to local capacities. Sri Lanka’s draft Disaster Management Bill had been under discussion for years, and there was an array of disaster-response structures at central level, all of which proved inadequate in addressing the disaster. While TAFREN and BRR are both agencies created in response to the disaster, there are significant differences. BRR has a clear geographical focus on a limited part of the Indonesian territory. The proportion of national territory under TAFREN’s authority was much larger. This led to different relationships between public-sector institutions in the two countries.

All four countries have centralised modes of governance and there are tensions both between different central institutions, and among the lower levels. In the Maldives, the Atoll and Island administrations were all appointed by the central authorities and therefore strongly loyal to the powers in the capital. They did not appear as important players providing leadership in their own right. In Indonesia, district authorities that had played a key role in the relief stage were later sidelined by provincial and national authorities during the recovery phase. This may change again with the rising role of BRR.

In general, there has been a tendency for international agencies to strengthen centralist tendencies. In most cases their main concern was to secure an agreement with the national authorities. They were less likely to make formal, or even informal, arrangements at the local level, and therefore might not have been able to recognise or respond to the subtle interplay of power that surrounded the relief operation.

**Chapter three3**

# Impact of the disaster at community level

## 3.1 Community perceptions of the response

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Inevitably the brunt of the disaster fell on local communities and they played the major role in the initial response. Although it is widely observed that this was the case and that many heroic deeds took place, much of the history has already been lost – at least to the outside world. Such histories will have immense value in helping local people to come to terms with their losses but they present problems to the researcher because it is hard to generalise even from hundreds of separate experiences. This analysis begins, therefore, a little after the disaster when outside relief began to reach communities. In general, the level of satisfaction with this assistance seems to have been highest at the start and then reduced over time, as indicated by the survey in Sri Lanka (Figure 3.1). The survey was designed to elicit both qualitative and quantitative feedback from a random sample of over 2,000 of the affected population in the worst-affected areas in Sri Lanka and Indonesia.

Although the overall rating is fairly positive, the more detailed questions indicate considerable dissatisfaction with the recognition and support given to local capacities. The Sri Lanka survey indicates that only about 20 per cent of claim-holders were satisfied with the way in which their skills were used in the response, while nearly half found this engagement somewhat unsatisfactory or worse (Figure 3.2).

The use of cash as an alternative to more conventional forms of assistance was particularly appreciated. This allowed people to use their skills and abilities in their own way, and so bypassed the need for detailed assessment and discussion. In the Aceh survey, Question 28 asks whether, in the first three months, cash transfers would have been preferable to the supply of food and other relief items. An overwhelming 90 per cent felt that cash in lieu of food and other relief items

**Figure 3.1 Gendered assessment of the tsunami response, for different phases and overall**

**BSQ1:**

How well were your needs provided in the first week

after the tsunami?

**BSQ2:**

How well were your needs provided in the first three

months after the tsunami?

**BSQ3:**

How well were your needs provided in the next five

months after that?

**BSQ16:**

In general, how do you rate the international

assistance to the tsunami?

**Male**

**60**

**%**

**50**

**40**

**30**

**20**

**10**

**0**

**BSQ1**

**BSQ2**

**BSQ3**

**BSQ16**

**Female**

**Good**

**Somewhat satisfied**

**sfied**

**Neither satisfied nor dissati**

**Somewhat dissatisfied**

**Bad**

**Female**

**Male**

**Female**

**Male**

**Female**

**Male**

would be better. Among Sri Lankan respondents, the clear majority (53 per cent) preferred cash to goods, which was supported by another 12 per cent who felt that cash would enable them to buy what they wanted.

## 3.2 Relationships between agencies and communities

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This lack of recognition for local skills and abilities arises from poor levels of communication and consultation. The Aceh claim-holder survey indicates the scale of this problem. Of the 1,000 respondents from four districts, 57 per cent stated that they had never been consulted at all about their needs. Only 20 per cent acknowledged that they had been asked, and since the survey was conducted 10 months after the tsunami, this is a matter of concern. In Sri Lanka 32 per cent of 1,055 claimholders surveyed said they had never been consulted.

All four of the country studies include reports of affected people having little information about the plans made for their recovery and resettlement. They were

**Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities**

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| **Figure 3.2: How well did the tsunami response use your skills and abilities?**  **(Sri Lanka claim-holder survey)** |
| **Bad – 23%**  **Somewhat**  **satisfied – 13%**  **Somewhat**  **Neither satisfied nor**  **dissatisfied – 24%**  **Good – 7%**  **No response – 8%**  **dissatisfied – 25%** |

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treated as passive recipients rather than active participants in the aid process. This devaluing of local capacity and consequent lack of participation in planning for recovery created a sense of distrust. IDPs in Laamu Atoll in the Maldives refused to move into temporary housing because they were afraid that if they did the government would not provide them with permanent housing. In some cases, lack of adequate exchange of information led to decisions that were directly damaging. In the Galle district of Sri Lanka, 150 people from poor fishing communities were resettled 15km inland, without proper consultation, to a transitional camp in a Walahanduwa tea plantation. There were no public transportation facilities, schools or local employment opportunities. These villagers now face difficulties in qualifying for permanent housing projects.

The low scores for consultation in the surveys may reflect a difference in perception between what local communities regard as ‘consultation’ and its meaning to international agencies. The agencies tend to underestimate the complexity of local communities and the challenge of consultation. Communities may be divided into many different groups, with differing needs, opinions and modes of representation. A variety of forms of community association in north Sumatra, for example, centre on the mosque. These include the avisan, mothers’ groups with special responsibilities for vulnerable people and funeral arrangements, generating funds through a simple lottery system, the yasinan or prayer recital groups and the magliyan masdi or youth groups. There is also a historical tradition of community self-help, called gotong royong.

In the affected areas of south Thailand, teachers and their schools, mosques and Buddhist monasteries function as informal centres for meetings. In several communities there are also savings and credit groups. On several islands in the Maldives there are women’s development committees or parent–teacher associations, as well as task-oriented community efforts that had persisted or grown into modest community-based organisations with names and structures (such as Tamiyyathul Saif and its offshoot, Youth Star on Ungufaroo Island). Immediately after the tsunami, all this complex web of civil society was mobilised in the local response, but was not properly recognised by the international agencies.

These circles of ‘capacities’ can be mobilised and built upon, and also include informal leaders. But if community groups are ignored then their capacity and potential may be undermined. Poor understanding about modes of representation can easily lead to capture of aid by ‘elites’ – people who are not necessarily rich by absolute standards but wealthy in relation to other local people. Elites are likely to be those who have the greatest assets. It is tempting to limit aid to a replacement of assets, and this process reinforces old power structures. Poorer people may become more marginalised and more vulnerable in relation to future disasters.

Agencies often find themselves dealing with the formal leaders appointed by government. But there are likely to be other informal leaders who come to the fore at times of crisis, and new types of organisations begin to appear. Examples are the ‘camp committees’ and ‘tsunami committees’ in Sri Lanka, or the ‘IDP committees’ and ‘shelter recovery committees’ in the Maldives. In the Maldives, island development and women’s development committees that existed before the tsunami took on new roles and demonstrated new skills and capacities.

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The reaction within the community to traditional leaders and new forms of organisation may not always be positive. In the Maldives for example, there were cases of strong opposition and rejection of island chiefs who are nominated by the central government. They were perceived to be discriminatory or corrupt. The survey in Sri Lanka also suggests considerable dissatisfaction with ‘community leaders’. Reasons for this include unfair and unequal distributions, providing wrong information and not paying heed to differing opinions. In Indonesia, some village leaders acknowledged that they felt overwhelmed by the multitude of new challenges, disputes and decisions to be made.

Especially where donor organisations are under pressure to spend funds rapidly, they may be unable to address the complexity of such processes within the community. And yet their aid can often have a significant effect on power structures and can bring about long-term change for better or worse. In the worst case, their actions could make communities more vulnerable to disasters in the future. Accordingly, agencies need to take time in order to understand more of the power structures and dynamics within communities, how these have been sustained in the past and how a crisis can open opportunities for change.

## 3.3 Social inequality and exclusion

The claim-holder survey in Aceh indicates that while 75 per cent of the respondents considered assistance to have been fairly distributed, a significant proportion (21 per cent) alleged that it was unfair. Nearly a third of those who felt it was unfair alleged favouritism on the part of those responsible for the delivery of

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goods. Among respondents in Sri Lanka, 35 per cent held that assistance was provided fairly, while 32 per cent disagreed. While this would seem to indicate an equal balance between these two views, most of the other main responses (totalling nearly 25 per cent) indicated the perception that the delivery of goods and services reflected favouritism and unfairness. Women-headed and poorer households were most at a disadvantage while those who were more articulate received greater benefits. This phenomenon may partly explain the gradual loss of confidence in the tsunami response. Aid was provided to marginal groups during the relief phase. Then however, being less informed and organised about their rights and less able to access common services, these groups tended to be overlooked in the recovery and reconstruction phases. Their special needs and constraints required a more proactive and strategic response in order to correct this tendency.

## 3.4 Impact on women

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The claim-holder survey in Sri Lanka (see Annex 7) indicates that women were less satisfied with the tsunami response in all phases than were their male counterparts. There are indications that one of the reasons for this may be women’s greater concerns about protection. International agencies did less than they should to protect women, especially in camps. For example, a group of war widows in Pasie Lou village, on the East coast of Aceh, left the temporary shelter of barracks to return home to their village to avoid violence in the camps even though this meant that they would no longer receive any official assistance.

There are some notable exceptions. Gender-based violence in the Maldives had once been considered a strictly private matter, and was only beginning to come to wider public notice before the tsunami. Discussion of issues around gender and child abuse under post-crisis stress situations has allowed an official recognition of the problem, with the Ministry of Gender and Social Services taking the lead. The country’s President spoke about the problem in his speech on International Women’s Day. Further examples of good practice include UNIFEM’s work in Aceh fostering women’s leadership, posting gender advisers in BRR, and forming a working group, in collaboration with UNFPA, to monitor Shari’a law and develop a code on violence against women.

Governments have not always recognised or advanced the property rights of women. CBOs with a focus on women criticised inflexibility in relocation, housing and livelihood strategies. The following are some examples.

* Widows could not opt to rebuild their houses near relatives under the ‘house for a house’ policy, which provided for rebuilding on the prior location of the house or in a designated location.
* Women remained at a disadvantage in accessing livelihood and other recovery programmes.
* In the Maldives, women with small businesses often had no official registration and because they could not prove that they had lost their livelihoods, they did not qualify for assistance.
* Women on a cash-for-work project in the Maldives were initially told to stop work because they were said to be slower than men. (The INGO responsible intervened in this case, and women were employed on other activities.)
* Many of the livelihood projects offered to women, such as mat-weaving and snack-making, were criticised by female claim-holders as too small to provide a living.

International agencies recognised many of these problems but the pressure to spend was so great that much money went to easily dispensed items such as fishing boats for men without corrective action to support women’s status.

## 3.5 Conclusions

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The claim-holder survey in Sri Lanka indicates that affected communities were critical of their local leaders for failing to ensure equity and inclusion. This suggests that international actors need to employ sophisticated forms of analysis and consultation if they are to avoid mistakes that may lead to the marginalisation of poorer people. They will need sensitive strategies even to maintain the status quo, let alone to increase the level of social equality. Agencies that had a sustained prior partnership at the community and sub-community level, or who had clear partnership strategies, were likely to be at an advantage but the scale of the disaster meant that even in such cases the agencies had to stretch themselves into sectors and areas in which they had limited understanding. The danger was to overlook the reality of ‘horizontal inequality’ and simply focus on vertical processes of delivering aid.

Considered collectively, the international tsunami response lost an opportunity to link its humanitarian intervention with longer-term structural development concerns. Whether achieving this link is actually a valid objective remains a matter of debate, at least in some quarters. Some argue that humanitarian aid is purely about ‘saving lives’ and any wider consequences are not their responsibility. This evaluation suggests that a ‘humanitarian’ response cannot be separated from political and social considerations because it affects the ability to deal with future disasters. Success is often measured in terms of numbers of assets distributed and scale of funds disbursed. But this may not be conducive to long-term recovery and mitigation of future disasters. Such a narrow ‘humanitarian’ approach will create dependency on international aid and weaken the capacity to respond to disasters that do not hit the headlines.

**Chapter four4**

# The interaction between international agencies and local civil society

## 4.1 Practices and constraints of the international agencies

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Many of the problems that emerged in the international response can be attributed to lack of understanding on the part of staff in international agencies, especially those not present in country before the disaster. The rapid arrival and departure of many agencies made it difficult to engage closely with communities and delayed the beginning of capacity strengthening. An estimated 300 international NGOs arrived in Aceh in the first two months to assist in the tsunami relief effort. Dozens left after a few months, considering that they had completed their work or lacking the institutional resources to match the scale of the recovery operation. As of October 2005, 178 registered international NGOs remain in the country. Even in the case of established agencies, the arrival of many new recruits, unfamiliar with the complex and dynamic local contexts, made it difficult to abide by humanitarian principles. The ad hoc hiring of international staff on short-term contracts is not only expensive but also reduced the appropriateness of the response.

Moreover, local agencies were sometimes undermined by the ‘poaching’ of their staff by international agencies. This competitive practice, which may be defined as making a direct offer to someone already in other employment regardless of the consequences, occurred widely in the early stages of the response. Where agencies started strengthening local capacity, this was often much later, after the damage had been done. This was by no means always the case. Some international agencies, notably in the Maldives, were successful in seconding international staff to support public-sector institutions at an early stage.

Agencies familiar with the country and with established local staff are likely to be at an advantage. The engagement of international actors with local capacities was most effective and efficient when it was built on sustained partnerships with local actors that existed before the disaster. Agencies in such partnerships are able to calibrate their understanding of the limits of international capacity, tailor their response to take account of national realities, and better appreciate the extent and nature of local capacity at the grassroots level. By the time of the evaluation, these issues were widely recognised and some international NGOs had launched new approaches to civil society. In Aceh, Oxfam’s NGO support network is a noteworthy example. But there was an unsatisfactory period coinciding with the shift from relief to recovery when local capacity was not given proper recognition; this indicates a weak point in international humanitarian responses.

## 4.2 Problems of scaling up international assistance

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Human resource policy had an important impact on the effectiveness of the response. The problem was not simply that agencies did not understand the need for sustainable ways of working and longer-term contracts for staff, but that their systems did not allow for it. Short-term contracts persisted long into the recovery phase under various rules for ‘disaster’ operations. In some cases the slow pace of recruitment of long-term staff reflected poor preparation and strategic planning. Pressure for quick results not only led to recruitment of inexperienced staff but also put such pressure on the most experienced so that they too were drawn into the result-oriented mode. All this reflected underlying problems of strategy.

The unprecedented flow of resources into the international humanitarian sector proved to be both a blessing and a challenge. There were few problems of funding shortage but agencies, under pressure to spend, often worked outside their core competencies. Lack of prior technical expertise and contextual experience was very strongly felt in the housing sector. This has evoked the most complaints from both claim-holders and stakeholders.

If pressure for quick results exceeds the ability of local organisations to scale up, agencies become more operational, employing large numbers of staff from outside. This was very much in evidence in the tsunami response. It created some resentment among local NGOs and has been the subject of criticism by governments, especially in Sri Lanka. According to the former Director General, Ministry of Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, positions filled by foreign personnel in the first phase included media and public relations officers, documentation specialists and information technology personnel, many of which could have been filled by qualified Sri Lankans. Agencies argue that it is essential to have staff members who understand their own systems rather than the context. But this raises the question of whether or not there has been enough preparation to ensure that systems can be easily transferred to local staff, and responsibilities delegated to local organisations.

The overwhelming problem is that unprecedented resource flows led to a situation where the key measurement for both donors and their partners became the ability to spend money quickly. This issue began to affect the response even during the relief phase. In the recovery phase it resulted in excessive focus on physical targets and capital-intensive projects instead of on longer-term capacity development.

## 4.3 Partnerships with civil society

There are examples of successful partnerships between international agencies and local civil society. In the Maldives for example, the Care Society in association with an international agency formed a partnership with 25 island CBOs to implement a joint tsunami-response programme. This added to the momentum that led to the nation’s first Civil Society Conference and concluded with the drafting of a Civil Society Charter for the first time in the country’s history. The international agency providing support to this process was not present in the Maldives before the disaster, but was able to develop a mature relationship quickly because it had clear notions and policies about such partnerships, and a strong commitment to capacity strengthening.

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But such supportive action was much less widespread than it should have been. In Indonesia, despite the devastation in Aceh, local CBO networks had helped to sustain affected communities through a difficult civil conflict over the past decades but were marginalised in the tsunami response. The need for careful, supportive relationships with such CBOs was overlooked until at least the latter part of 2005. This was a lost opportunity in terms of longer-term recovery and future disaster mitigation. It also had more immediate effects. Local organisations are particularly good at identifying and reaching remote areas and marginalised groups. For example, the NGOs Holi’a’na and LPAM in Indonesia were able to reach and work in isolated earthquake-struck communities on the island of Nias such as Luaha Muzoi when international NGOs were not. External support for capacity strengthening with such organisations at an early stage might have enabled them to do much more.

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Even where international agencies gave grants to local organisations, local actors have commonly criticised international agencies for rigid and over-demanding procedures. In Aceh, NGOs criticised the limited grant size per project approval, the short timeframe (maximum of three months) and the tedious monitoring processes including monthly reporting. The local organisation was simply used to deliver a service that had been decided upon by a donor organisation. This relationship was often seen as ‘sub-contracting’ rather than genuine partnership. The relationship is inevitably difficult because international actors, with limited local understanding, control the resources while local actors may know much more but are dependent on aid. Downward accountability and proactive use of information by the international agency are necessary in order to establish trust and lead to deeper dialogue.

It may be said that there are double standards in the contrast between the conditions imposed on local actors by international agencies and those that the same agencies adopt to govern their own programmes. For example, there is often a difference between the level of administrative overhead allowed to local actors and the overheads of international agencies. As a rule, local actors are required to be accountable at the district and sub-district levels, whereas international agencies and national NGOs are not. Moreover, there are hardly any avenues available to local actors for dialogue about these issues. There are very few independent bodies to monitor and influence the process. Examples are Transparency International and a local Anti-Corruption movement in Indonesia, while in Sri Lanka, Aid Watch and two Citizens’ Commissions have just begun to work. In Thailand, the mass media have highlighted some of these issues, while so far there is no comparable initiative in the Maldives.

## 4.4 Impact of conflict

The civil conflict in Sri Lanka and Indonesia made effective engagement with local communities in the conflict zones more difficult. In Indonesia, there was less overlap between conflict-affected and tsunami-affected populations than in Sri Lanka, where conflict hampered independent decision making at all levels in the many districts affected by both conflict and tsunami. In some areas, direct contact with claimholders could only take place through the LTTE. The Sri Lanka claim-holder survey indicates that residents of the conflict areas, particularly ethnic minorities, were not empowered to voice their dissatisfaction of the tsunami response and had no significant recourse to redress when an injustice had taken place.

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## 4.5 Conclusions

At the local level, pre-tsunami baseline capacities in the four countries varied considerably. While there were notable exceptions and some instances of best practice among international actors, in general there has been inadequate recognition of the extensive and diverse local and national capacities that exist at institutional and individual levels. The international response has not facilitated local or national capacities in a systematic and sustainable manner. This has made it harder to link humanitarian intervention with longer-term structural concerns, and in some cases has unintentionally exacerbated inequalities and tensions. Even in the areas where both conflict and the tsunami seriously debilitated local capacity, as in Aceh and war-affected areas of Sri Lanka, more could have been made of this capacity by systematic mapping at an earlier stage and a stronger focus on capacity strengthening.

International agencies have remained much longer than necessary in ‘emergency response’ mode. It has taken until the recovery phase for most actors to reevaluate their practices and to begin to incorporate more consultative processes. The underlying problem seems to be that international agencies were not clear about making partnerships with local CBOs and NGOs from the outset. They saw service delivery as the objective, and such partnerships were simply a means to that end. This led to problems when it was necessary to change gear from relief work to more developmental approaches in the recovery phase. By that stage, local organisations had already been weakened, either by being starved of support or pushed into a ‘sub-contracting’ mode. The loss of staff from these organisations was a particularly severe problem.

**Chapter five5**

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# Conclusions

## 5.1 The sequencing of capacities

In the classic view of disasters the immediate need is to deliver services; in the medium-term the issue is to restore capacities at least to the pre-disaster level; the longer-term aim is to reduce risk and vulnerability by increasing capacity. Different capacities will be called upon at different times. Table 5.1 lists just a few of the many capacities and the sequence in which they might be needed.

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|  | **Table 5.1 Capacities in different phases of disaster response** | |  |
| **Phase Examples of relevant capacities** | |
| **Rescue and relief** | Search and rescue, determination of death, burial of bodies |
| Damage and loss assessment, distinguishing between needs |  |
| Restoring basic access |  |
| Immediate relief materials |  |
| Providing information to affected people about search and rescue |  |
| National coordination |  |
|  | **Recovery** | Restoring infrastructure and services |  |
| Conducting participatory assessments |  |
| Delivering support for livelihoods, transitional shelter, etc. |
| Providing information to affected people on the recovery process |
| Formulating recovery policy |
| Developing policies to address the interface between conflict and disaster |
| Communities to take collective and equitable decisions |
| Ability to influence and hold accountable |

While using local capacity is one thing, building local capacity so that it becomes more and more effective through the different phases is something very different. International agencies tended to exploit what capacity they could find in the relief stage and then were surprised to find that this local capacity did not conveniently transform itself into a suitable tool for recovery and reconstruction. Instead, local capacity was undermined, issues of inequality and marginalisation became more intractable and distrust developed. Agencies found themselves supporting elites and unable to address the problems of marginalised groups.

A society that handles its own issues of inequality and marginalisation is likely to be able to cope better with future disasters. It will ensure that vulnerable and isolated groups are not forgotten or ignored. This means that building capacity must include an element of social equality and responsibility. In many of the country studies within this evaluation, there were serious problems of social division and even conflict.

Strengthening capacities is not simply about supporting institutional structures but a more complex political process that involves the empowerment of poorer and more excluded people so that when disaster strikes they have a valid claim on their community, local officials and national government.

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From this perspective the tsunami response must be assessed not only in terms of delivery of goods and services but also in terms of whether it enabled and empowered local capacities, especially among the most marginalised groups, to flourish. Too often the social effects of aid are unknown to the agencies that caused them. The importance of a focus on capacity-strengthening is that it represents a more sustainable approach to disasters.

A rather different approach to these issues begins with rights. This acknowledges more explicitly that the vulnerabilities of certain individuals and groups may be created and unfairly sustained by other actors in their local and/or national environment. In this argument the responsibility for disaster response rests with the state; the international panoply of direct disaster response undermines this political responsibility. Capacity building goes beyond issues of community development to wider questions about the state and political representation. It leads to social organisation and advocacy. Most international actors are uncomfortable with this, although some have explored the ‘rights-based approach to disasters’. For some the problem is workability; for others it is the question of legitimacy to intervene in any way other than offering ‘apolitical’ humanitarian relief. For others still, the problem lies in the weakness of many states and the important role of the local community. But the thrust of all these arguments is that the process of relief is not politically neutral. It has profound effects on issues such as inequality, marginalisation, social organisation, and political rights. The international humanitarian system is directed toward disasters that have overwhelmed local and national capacities to cope. This involves provision of immediate relief, but it also implies a responsibility to support the development of local and national management capacity so that it will be better able to deal with future disasters.

The tsunami occurred mainly in an area of the world that is not characterised by weak and fragile states, as in much of Africa. Political representation and

democracy are day-to-day issues in the lives of the people. Unfortunately, humanitarian policy takes a limited view not only in relation to local capacities but also in relation to national capacities, including the rights-based approaches and political aspirations that help to develop accountable government. The fact that both India and Thailand practically refused international assistance, and coped rather well, is enough in itself to suggest that there is some re-thinking to do about humanitarian aid.

## 5.2 Principles and practice in the humanitarian system

This evaluation highlights the disparity between the stated policies of international humanitarian actors and the operational realities. The principles are lofty, as in the case of participation (Box 5.1), but the practice is often very different. When the aid system is under pressure in crisis situations, the imperative to deliver services is given the highest priority. The tsunami response is perhaps an extreme example of this overall trend.

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To some extent this results from strong pressures for ‘results’ coming from the HQs of international agencies. But it also reflects a more general tendency to underestimate local capacity and give excessive importance to the delivery of external assistance as if there were no local response at all. This is a myth that re-confirms itself. By ignoring local capacity, the role of external aid seems all the more important. New aid workers arrive on the scene assuming that there is no local capacity to work with. The more external aid there is, the more local capacity is undermined. The hitch is that, having started off in such a way, relationships and strategies fail to develop during the recovery phase and longterm disaster mitigation becomes impossible. The response stalls at around the six-month mark, as it did in the case of the tsunami disaster.

For more than 20 years, aid agencies have been seeking to refine and develop the basic concepts of humanitarian response. Norms and standards, such as the Red Cross Code and Sphere Common Standards, recognise the need to enhance local capacity in humanitarian responses. There is considerable convergence in all these documents about the basic principles. This is summarised as principle 8 in The Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship (2003), which urges donors to:

Strengthen the capacity of affected countries and local communities to prevent, prepare for, mitigate and respond to humanitarian crises, with the goal of ensuring that governments and local communities are better able to meet their responsibilities and co-ordinate effectively with humanitarian partners.

The key to all this projected involvement, support and capacity building is the relationship with local communities. Here too, there is a strong convergence of views (Box 5.1). What seems to be lacking is the sense that this is more than a

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**Box 5.1 Participation in international standards**

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| **IFRC (1994) The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief – Article 7**  “Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief aid. Disaster response assistance should never be imposed upon the beneficiaries. Effective relief and lasting rehabilitation can best be achieved where the intended beneficiaries are involved in the design, management and implementation of the assistance programme. We will strive to achieve full community participation in our relief and rehabilitation programmes.”  There are many good reasons to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of aid, including the acknowledgement of respect and dignity of people, legitimating of aid efforts, enhancing the efficiency of aid, and improving its knowledge base, sustainability and learning capacity.  **The Sphere Project (2000): Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response: Common Standard 1: Participation (p28)**  “The disaster-affected population actively participates in the assessment, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the assistance programme.  Key indicators:   * Women and men of all ages from the disaster-affected and wider local populations, including vulnerable groups, receive information about the assistance programme, and are given the opportunity to comment to the assistance agency during all stages of the project cycle * Written assistance programme objectives and plans should reflect the needs, concerns and values of disaster-affected people, particularly those belonging to vulnerable groups and contribute to their protection * Programming is designed to maximise the use of local skills and capacities.”   **UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998)**  Participation of IDPs:  “The authorities concerned shall endeavour to involve those affected, particularly women, in the planning and management of the relocation” (Principle 7 (3) (d)). In the distribution of humanitarian assistance, “Special efforts should be made to ensure the full participation of women in the planning and distribution of these supplies” (Principle 18 (3)). “Special efforts should be made to ensure the full participation of IDPs in the planning and management of their return or resettlement and reintegration” (Principle 28 (2)). |

matter of politeness. Consultation does not need to occur because it would be rude to do otherwise, but because it is essential for success – provided that success is defined as long-term reduction in vulnerability. If success is defined in terms of gratitude for aid received and the likelihood that more will be needed in the next disaster, then consultation as a matter of politeness will be enough. The question is whether the aim is to preserve the credibility of the humanitarian system or to abolish vulnerability.[[11]](#footnote-11) And this question revolves around the issue of capacity.

## 5.3 Conclusions on the tsunami response

To a significant extent, local ownership of the tsunami response was undermined by the actions of international agencies. In some cases, recognition and engagement with local capacity was totally lacking, particularly where capacities were not visible in the form recognised by international agencies. In other cases, local capacities were rendered even more vulnerable by the response. CBOs and NGOs became contracted organisations, corruption spread and inappropriate forms of leadership were able to flourish.

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This failure to engage appropriately with local capacities compromised the effectiveness and efficiency of the response in the long term. Success in the relief phase cannot be determined solely in terms of delivery of necessary relief items and services. The period of saving lives was practically over by the time the international agencies arrived. So there was little justification for the focus on delivery rather than capacity strengthening. And the fact that saving lives depended almost entirely on local communities is a strong argument in favour of long-term vulnerability reduction through capacity strengthening.

In general, there has been a tendency for international agencies to strengthen centralism, unless they took deliberate action otherwise. In most cases, the agencies’ main concern was an agreement with the national authorities – and without similar formal arrangements at local level, they might not recognise or respond to the subtle interplay of power that surrounded the relief operation. The international community has raised awareness about the rights and entitlements of IDPs, at least in the Maldives, and has provided some international guidance in that regard, although with uneven success. National institutions for disaster preparedness were strengthened by the activities of international agencies, and particularly the UN, in Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Thailand. But the focus of activities in this area to date has tended to be at national level, with less attention to provincial and district levels, and only in limited ways at community level. Some of these changes may prove to be purely bureaucratic, without support or buy-in from local communities, and therefore unsustainable in the longer term.

## 5.4 Lessons from the tsunami response

Some agencies were beginning to rectify the lack of attention to capacity strengthening by the time of the evaluation. Capacity strengthening, with its necessary processes of participation and consultation, is clearly recognised in international humanitarian standards. But the way in which the humanitarian sector is funded, by sudden inputs following public appeals, does not facilitate this process in practice. Instead it encourages an emphasis on rapid service delivery, exaggeration of the agencies’ own importance and understatement of the role of local people. It focuses on the short term rather than the long term, even though in reality recovery will be a five- to ten-year process.

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Although international aid inevitably involves some level of participation and consultation simply as means to the goal of service delivery, capacity building of communities through information, transparency and accountability are lacking. A fundamental re-orientation of the humanitarian sector is required to recognise that the ownership of humanitarian assistance rests with the claim-holders – i.e. that local capacities are the starting point, that long-term sustainable risk reduction is the aim, and that the role of other players is to support. Only when vulnerable people take control of their environment will they escape from vulnerability. Otherwise they will simply be dependent on fickle Western public responses and the reliability or otherwise of international aid.

There is a need to rethink the end goal of humanitarian assistance and move from a service-delivery approach to a capacity-empowering framework, or in other words to shift the emphasis from delivery to support and facilitation.

This is not an easy task. Communities as well as NGOs are subject to elite capture and corruption. Intense pressures apply in favour of short-term results that symbolise the orthodox view of the aid giver. But unless the attempt is made, communities will never be secure against the threat of future disasters. Aid and dependency will be perpetuated.

Within the humanitarian system, the tsunami disaster demonstrates the problem of the ‘mega-response’ from the Western public. The unprecedented level of global public donations made the international NGO sector the key player in the international tsunami response, both in absolute terms of size of country budgets and in relative terms compared with the UN and bilateral agencies. With this new role should have come a responsibility to strengthen partnerships with national and local authorities and to join with others in creating new formal mechanisms for collaboration and accountability. Information could have been handled far more strategically, so that affected people were able to assert their needs and speak on equal terms with aid givers. But INGOs were slow in adapting to this new reality, and remained in competitive and target-driven mode until quite late in the response.

Considered collectively, the response was a lost opportunity. It could have linked humanitarian intervention with longer-term structural development concerns.

Some would argue that this is not a valid objective. The ‘humanitarian imperative’ is simply to deliver aid as fast as possible on the basis that immediate need comes first. But where the potential clearly exists to address not only one disaster but the whole phenomenon of disasters, it seems appropriate to say that immediate needs may come first, but the list is a long one. This evaluation indicates that, at least in the countries studied, the humanitarian response cannot be separated from wider social and political considerations. Success cannot be measured in numbers of assets distributed and scale of funds disbursed. High numbers may imply distortions in local social structures and economies. These will not be conducive to long-term recovery and mitigation of future disasters. Under such a purely ‘humanitarian’ approach, structural discrimination and dependency on international aid are likely to continue.

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**Chapter six6**

# Recommendations

6.1 Key messages

The evaluation team identified three key areas for the attention of international actors. They all relate to existing international standards but on the basis of this evaluation appear to be the areas in which the response has been weak.

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* **Engagement with local and national capacities.** This includes the

ability to recognise and identify local capacities and the need to include local communities in planning and decision-making through participation and consultation, and commitment to devolve decision-making as far as possible.

* **Attention to social inequalities, exclusion and hierarchies.** Capacity should be defined in relation to not only skills and training, but also the empowerment of poorer and marginalised groups. The capacity of a community to resist disaster is particularly sensitive to this. It includes not simply identification of such groups but ensuring that particularly their voices are heard in decision-making.
* **Contribution to an enabling environment and context.** Marginalised groups should improve their position in relation to communities, and communities in relation to district and national authorities. The basis for this process is empowerment through the strategic management of information, and strengthening downward accountability. Advocacy is also an important element but should be based on enhanced local capacities rather than external interventions.

6.2 Recommendations

For recommendations on specific countries please refer to the individual report summaries presented in the Annexes. The key messages above translate into the following general recommendations to international agencies.

## **6.2.1 Overarching recommendation**

Sector-wide discussions at the global level should be initiated to address the need for a fundamental re-orientation of the humanitarian sector based on the principle that the ownership of humanitarian assistance should rest with claim-holders. This implies a shift of emphasis from delivery to support and facilitation. Such discussions are expected to facilitate the implementation of the following recommendations.

## **6.2.2 Recommendation 1: Engagement with local and national capacities**

* International agencies should prepare in advance for the problems of scaling up not simply by identifying resources but also by making their systems and practices suitable for maximum participation by local people.
* They should also make plans to shift into more collective ways of working during ‘mega-disasters’ in order to ensure that they do not extend beyond their competence but instead link with others and share roles.
* They should have clear partnership strategies and develop local partnerships from the start in order to avoid glitches during the transition to recovery.

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* They should institute procedures for making grants for longer time periods even from the outset of an intervention, and should critically examine reporting requirements.

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* Specific agreements and protocols should be made to limit ‘poaching’ of staff particularly to ensure that local capacity is not undermined.

## **6.2.3 Recommendation 2: Attention to social inequalities, exclusion and hierarchies**

* Planning should be based on the assumption that aid is likely to reinforce inequalities within the community unless corrective action is taken.
* Planning should also take account of the complexity of community structures and the need, therefore, for knowledgeable local intermediaries with power to influence decisions.
* Inclusion of the most marginalised should be treated as a fundamental principle or right, regardless of costs.
* Aid should be given according to need rather than limited to a particular disaster – in the case of the tsunami response, people affected by conflict should be included in aid responses.
* Strategies should be developed to ensure that women and marginalised groups have full access to information.
* Women claim-holders should be represented in all decision-making bodies affecting them.

## **6.2.4 Recommendation 3: Contribution to an enabling environment and context**

* Communities should be encouraged to develop their own contingency plans for disasters and receive material support with the proviso that adequate provision must be made for poorer and marginalised groups. This should extend to a wide range of civil-society organisations including women’s groups.

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* National governments in disaster-prone countries should develop comprehensive plans and procedures for disaster management, including the management of information in order to ensure that communities are kept fully informed at all stages of the response.
* They should also make plans not only for the establishment of a central body to manage disaster responses but also to enable cooperation between departments and between the centre and local government.
* Those responding to a disaster should ensure that full information about their activities is available to all those affected, especially in local communities. This might include public notices giving financial information, and public audits.
* Agencies should strengthen watchdog movements and support the mass media to promote better understanding of the response and opportunities for feedback and dialogue.

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# Annex 1: Terms of reference

## Evaluation of the impact of tsunami response on local and national capacities

### Background

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On 26 December 2004, devastating earthquakes along the western coast of Northern Sumatra, the Andaman Islands and Nicobar Islands caused tsunamis to sweep over South and Southeast Asia, reaching as far as the shores of East Africa and producing one of the worst natural disasters in modern history. Those countries worst affected were India, Indonesia, the Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, with others including Myanmar and Somalia also suffering damage and loss of life. Countries less severely affected by the tsunami included Bangladesh, Kenya, Malaysia, the Seychelles and Tanzania.

In total, more than 170,000 people are thought to have died. Overall, an estimated 2 million people have been directly or indirectly affected, of whom 1.7 million are internally displaced.[[12]](#footnote-12)Damage and destruction to infrastructure has destroyed people’s livelihoods and left many homeless and without adequate water, sanitation, food and healthcare facilities.

Governments and people around the world responded with unprecedented generosity in solidarity with the rescue and relief efforts of the affected communities and local and national authorities. This has meant that considerable resources have been available for relief and recovery activities by the international community.

The actual extent of damage to infrastructure, state capacity and lives and livelihood varied from country to country. Sri Lanka, with over 31,000 dead, nearly a million displaced and intense damage to the livelihood capacities of fisheries and tourism sectors (total losses and damage about US$1.5 billion), was the worst hit in terms of the proportionate damage to its infrastructure and local government capacity to respond. In absolute terms, Indonesia suffered the most in terms of life loss (over 128,000 killed), and extent of localised damage to infrastructure and capacity in Aceh (estimated to be between US$4.5 and 5 billion). While the human toll in the Maldives (81 dead and 21 missing) was not as great as in some neighbouring countries, proportionate to its size and economy, nearly a third of the population was affected and its economic capacity severely damaged (with estimated damages and losses of about 62 per cent of GDP or US$450 million[[13]](#footnote-13)). Thailand (with over 5,400 dead and 20,000 households affected) and India (human toll around 10,750, recovery and reconstruction costs estimated at US$1.2 billion) suffered considerable damage in absolute terms, yet in terms of the impact on local and national capacities, the damage was not as significant as for Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Maldives.

Pre-existing conflicts in Sri Lanka and Indonesia posed additional challenges and opportunities for relief and recovery efforts, limiting both local and international capacities.

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The impact of the tsunami on different countries reflected not only the force with which it struck, but also the individual country’s levels of disaster preparedness, and the local infrastructure in terms of ability to respond to a disaster of such proportions. India and Thailand showed a remarkable ability to respond to the crisis effectively, particularly in the recovery phase. These two countries restricted the flow of external assistance to their recovery efforts because they felt they could manage with less international assistance. In Indonesia the military sector is well developed, and played a large part in the response. By contrast, Somalia has no government and was therefore unable to mount more than a very limited internal response.

Disasters offer unique opportunities for change. Relief efforts can serve not only to reverse losses but also can set the direction for long-term sustainable recovery. If the transition from relief to recovery is perceived essentially as a development activity, and local capacity is engaged and enhanced throughout the process, the legacy of even a major disaster such as the tsunami can be a tangible improvement in the quality of life for the survivors.

The combination of such an opportunity to set the direction for development, and the unprecedented level of international assistance, provide a chance to take stock and assess the contributions of international actors undertaking relief and recovery efforts.

## Purpose, objectives and scope of this study

This evaluation is one of five thematic evaluations being co-coordinated by the Tsunami

Evaluation Coalition (TEC), an informal grouping of donors, UN agencies, INGOs and the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement, formed to develop a sector-wide approach to evaluations of tsunami response, including multi-agency evaluations of those aspects of the tsunami relief, recovery and rehabilitation activities which will benefit from joint evaluation.[[14]](#footnote-14) In tandem with the other four studies, this evaluation will therefore serve as a test case for undertaking joint but parallel multi-agency evaluations within a larger, umbrella evaluation effort.

### Purpose

The purpose of the evaluation is to determine the impact of the tsunami response – including the role of international actors – on local and national capacities for relief and recovery, and risk reduction. That is, ‘What worked and why?’, and ‘What could have been improved and how?’, and ‘What did not work and why?’ are questions that need addressing in order to: (i) provide lessons for strengthening the ongoing activities[[15]](#footnote-15) as well as future responses to emergencies, and (ii) hold international actors accountable to the individual, institutional and country donors.

### Objectives

The objectives of the evaluation are to:

1. assess how local and national capacities changed as a result of the tsunami response
2. assess how well international actors engaged with local and national capacities in providing relief and recovery assistance
3. assess the intended and unintended changes to local and national capacities as a result of the tsunami response by international actors

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1. assess the extent to which transition/ risk reduction/ recovery programming, planned and implemented, is likely to influence local and national capacities
2. distil lessons learned for efforts to strengthen local and national capacities for future crisis response and recovery
3. ensure that all of the above assess and highlight gender differences and the varied experiences of women and men.19

### Scope

The assessment will take into account the three phases of the tsunami assistance in the first six months: (a) immediate emergency, (b) early recovery phase, (c) initiating the transition from recovery to development. It is understood that the transition between these phases is blurred between different sectors. Phases occurred in parallel and lasted for different lengths of time in different sectors and at different locations.

The evaluation will be based on in-depth field studies of three of the following: Sri Lanka, Indonesia, the Maldives and Thailand.

For each of these case studies the evaluation will consider intended and unintended changes in local and national capacities among different sections of the population. The core of the evaluation will be to consider the impact of the actions of international actors on local and national capacities but, in order to understand the total impact of the response on capacity, a ‘stocktaking’ of the impact of the national response will be included. The assessment will also identify the contextual constraints and opportunities in which these changes happened.

These capacities include: (a) capacity to respond to the disaster as shown by those affected, NGOs, local women’s organisations, the private sector and local and national government (including capacities of women, men and other vulnerable groups in affected communities to participate in decision-making related to relief and recovery efforts, local governance, resource mobilisation, planning and implementation, protection, advocacy, training, and livelihoods recovery); and (b) Capacity of community members to access services and markets (for labour as well as goods and services), including the capacities of the private sector to recover and create livelihoods, and relief- and recovery-related services of government.

The evaluation will focus on communities, formal and informal civil-society institutions (including NGOs), and local and national government, considering the different capacities and experiences of women, men and other vulnerable groups at each level. The evaluation will include an assessment of the baseline capacities in place at the time of the tsunami to respond to the relief and recovery needs of the affected.

## Selection of case-study countries

The selection of countries for field studies has been made to illustrate a cross-section of response situations based on the following:

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1. extent of tsunami damage and reconstruction needs
2. response capacity with regard to state as well as civil-society capacity
3. level of international support
4. local context, including pre-existing conflict, linked to addressing capacity needs
5. availability of evaluative evidence
6. subject to time and budget, the inclusion of a ‘control’ variable country – that is, one in which the response was largely handled internally.

The four following countries will be studied subject to the security situation: Sri Lanka, Indonesia (Aceh), the Maldives and Thailand.

## Evaluation criteria

Performance will be evaluated using the DAC Principles for the Evaluation of Development Assistance, OECD (1991): relevance/appropriateness, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability/connectedness. Gender analysis and the protection of vulnerable groups will be fully integrated at every stage and in all aspects of the evaluation.

## Key questions for consideration

Key questions are to be addressed at local and national levels to assess whether international actors did the right things and if they did things right. Different groups of people have different capacities to cope with crises, as well as different vulnerabilities. In addition, the capacities of one group of people may change over time. It should be noted, therefore, that these questions are also posed to understand whether response activities strengthened the capacities of the weak and vulnerable groups, particularly women, children and the poor, and if the efforts strengthened local participation.

With relevance to all the key questions, the team must identify as far as possible the differential impact of relief and response activities on the capacities of vulnerable groups in each situation. If it becomes apparent that some groups benefited very little from the assistance, their views should be sought, as they may reveal problems with the targeting of beneficiaries.

Initial questions are included in Appendix B. These are to serve as a starting point. A detailed list of questions to be covered in the evaluation will be discussed when the evaluation team has been appointed.

In the light of this study’s role as a test case for undertaking joint but parallel multi-agency evaluations within a larger, umbrella evaluation effort, the report should also document what has been learned through the process in terms of good practice in multi-agency evaluation.

## Management of the evaluation

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The two lead agencies (DMI and UNDP) will form a thematic Evaluation Steering Committee[[16]](#footnote-16) (ESC) with the support of UNICEF, Action Aid and CordAid to manage the evaluation. The ESC will be responsible for ensuring an inclusive process to finalise the ToR, mobilise resources, identify the team members, and ensure quality throughout the process. The theme management group will benefit from the advice of the TEC Evaluation Adviser and Coordinator (EAC), who will provide guidance to the group to ensure coherence among the evaluations of the five thematic areas. The ToR will be circulated to the relevant UN agencies and Resident/Humanitarian Coordinators.

A wider working group will also have input into the evaluation in terms of providing funding, in-kind assistance at country level (for example, accessing key stakeholders including beneficiaries, hosting workshops, providing documentary evidence for the desk reviews), commenting on the ToR and final report, and assisting with follow-up in their own agencies. A team of independent consultants will be recruited to carry out the evaluation. The UNDP Evaluation Office will provide daily management and logistical support to the evaluation team.

## Evaluation methodology and team composition

All members of the team will participate in a joint inception workshop with all the evaluation teams, to be held close to the start of the evaluation,[[17]](#footnote-17) during which the detailed methodology will be agreed on, in consultation with the TEC Evaluation Adviser and Coordinator (EAC) and the lead agencies.

It is envisaged that the approach will encompass a number of methods, including:

* desk reviews (including additional in-depth studies of countries not visited for casestudies)
* stakeholder interviews (with male and female beneficiaries and vulnerable groups, community and civil-society groups, local organisations, local and national government, private institutions, international agencies and INGOs) based on a semi-structured questionnaire that will gather both quantitative and qualitative information
* timelines to identify key events and key decision-making points
* focus-group discussions with male and female beneficiaries
* semi-structured interviews with key policy makers
* a review of the results of previous studies of post-disaster recovery to see the extent to which the findings of this evaluation are coherent with, reinforce or contradict previous findings.

Analysis will be both qualitative and quantitative. Examples of good/best practice will be noted and a comparative analysis made of relief and recovery efforts leading to positive changes in capacities across communities, institutions and countries. Within any emergency response it must be noted that different stakeholders may have different perceptions of relief and response, and may not share common objectives, possibly even seeking contradictory results. In order to minimise the bias of one group of stakeholders, different methodologies that can serve to triangulate findings are important. The methodology must enable the evaluation team to consider the differential impact of relief and response activities on the capacities of different, vulnerable groups in all the situations considered.

It is accepted that ‘Current thinking is that no evaluation can be “value-free”, and that values should always be made explicit’ (ALNAP, 2004, p 28). The question of the value framework of this evaluation needs to be part of the discussion around detailed methodology.

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In addition to the inception workshop, national workshops will be held for briefing and debriefing at the start and end of each country study. These will seek to involve a broad spectrum of female and male participants including stakeholders, beneficiaries and decision makers in the government. These workshops in case-study countries will be conducted jointly with other thematic evaluations and coordinated by the EAC to minimise duplication of effort and disruption to stakeholders and beneficiaries.

The purpose of the initial in-country workshop is: (i) to introduce the evaluation to key beneficiaries and stakeholders; (ii) to consult with the participants as part of the process of refining the ToR; and (iii) to identify relevant civil-society networks, key informants and key stakeholders for the evaluation. These should represent both women and men, and vulnerable groups such as IDPs and people living in conflict areas. During these initial workshops, an emphasis will be placed on promoting participation and ownership by local stakeholders, male and female, during the case studies. Local views will be solicited on capacity issues which beneficiaries and stakeholders consider to be important, as well as on those groups, informants and government actors to be included in interviews.

Finally, a debriefing workshop will be held at the end of each case study so that preliminary findings, lessons learned, and recommendations can be thoroughly discussed with local stakeholders, both male and female. It is important that information/feedback on the evaluation process and its preliminary findings and recommendations are provided to the district levels (operational level), and not to the national level only. This information will also be posted on the TEC Online Forum so that other evaluations can benefit from the process.

Upon completing all the country studies, the team will meet and jointly agree on the findings, key lessons and recommendations emerging. Based on this discussion, the team leader will be responsible for preparing the draft evaluation report in close collaboration with the other team members. The draft evaluation report will be available by end November and findings and lessons presented and disseminated to all relevant stakeholders.

Key findings and recommendations from this final capacity report will be synthesised by three authors: a lead synthesis writer, the EAC, and the researcher/deputy coordinator into one synthesis report to be presented to, and discussed by, the TEC.

The evaluation team will consist of an evaluation team leader and two team members, at least one of which will be a national consultant for each of the country case studies. The team will represent a balance of skills and experience, including:

* substantial evaluation experience
* experience of humanitarian response and recovery programmes
* familiarity with the region
* experience of working with government departments
* experience of working with local organisations (civil societies and NGOs)
* experience of capacity assessment and building
* gender balance and demonstrable experience in integrating gender considerations[[18]](#footnote-18)
* experience in beneficiary consultation, surveys, and conducting focus groups

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* excellent spoken and written communication skills in English
* sectoral technical expertise (for example, health, water, education, socioeconomics – accepting that not all sectors can be covered).

It is hoped that, in addition to the national consultant for each case-study country, other members of the team will come from the region. To the extent possible, the team will have competence to ensure an approach sensitive to issues such as corruption, HIV/AIDS and environmental issues whenever relevant. In addition to leading the capacity team, the team leader will liaise with the other five thematic leads and the EAC, consulting with him on methodological and timing/implementation issues.

The evaluation will start in early August 2005. The field studies will take place during September and October,[[19]](#footnote-19) with the draft report produced by the end of November. The project will be finalised by the end of December 2005.

## Outputs

* An inception report of no more than 2,500 words outlining the team’s approach, due three weeks after the start of the evaluation.
* Interim status report (or PowerPoint presentation) per country of no more than 1,500 words reflecting the key issues identified by the team and prepared prior to departure from the study country. The report will be presented at the debriefing workshop at the end of each field study, to be organised by UNDP and DMI. This meeting should include

at minimum agencies that are members of the theme evaluation and relevant government counterparts.

* A final report of no more than 20,000 words, excluding an executive summary of no more than three pages and annexes. For further guidance for the report, see the ALNAP Quality Proforma.

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### Tentative time schedule

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|  | **Tentative time schedule** | |  |
| **Date** | **Activity** |
| July 5–19 | Post working ToR on the web, advertise for consultants |
|  | July 22–25 | Selection of consultants |  |
| July 25–29 | Initial briefing visit of team leader |  |
| Aug 1–19 | Desk review |  |
|  | Aug 22 – Sept 2 | Review of desk review  Setting up appointments in case-study countries with stakeholders, initial HQ interviews in NY, Geneva and  Bangkok, preparation of national workshops in collaboration with EAC |  |
|  | Sept 7–8 | Joint inception workshop with other evaluation teams in Geneva |  |
| Sept 9–Nov 4 | Field studies:  3 weeks Sri Lanka (including national workshop)  3 weeks Aceh (including national workshop)  2 Weeks Maldives/Thailand (including national workshop) |
|  | Nov 7–11 | 1 week team analysis and joint work |  |
|  | Nov 14–Dec 2 | Meeting for 6 team leaders with TEC EAC to consider the key issues and lessons learned before draft reports prepared. Venue tbc  Report writing |  |
| Dec 2 | Submission of draft report |
|  | Dec 5–16 | Review of report by steering group |  |
| Dec 19–23 | Formal debriefing of TL |  |
| Early Jan | Synthesis workshop (tentative), includes written comments on draft synthesis report |

### Use of the evaluation report

The final report will be a stand-alone report and will be discussed at relevant interagency forums, such as the December ALNAP meeting and the February IASC meeting. The report will also feed into the TEC synthesis report – planned to be available in draft form by late December 2005. The draft and final report will be made available on the dedicated TEC website the Online Forum, and disseminated through all appropriate channels.

The recommendations made by the team should be discussed by the IASC, including a working group on gender, and should be responded to by the concerned agencies. A management response matrix will be prepared once the report has been finalised, involving all commissioning agencies.

### Appendix A: Roles of key groups and individuals in the evaluation

#### Role of the thematic evaluation steering committee (ESC) (e.g. Capacities ESC)

A steering committee composed of a core group of participating agencies will be set up to provide overall management guidance for each thematic evaluation. The ESC will be chaired by the commissioning agency or agencies. The role of the steering committee is to:

* ensure an inclusive process to finalise the ToR
* provide funding for the evaluation and assist in the mobilisation of resources (financial and in-kind)
* participate in the selection of the evaluation team members (identifying the team, and ensuring quality throughout the process)
* participate in teleconferences on key issues regarding this evaluation
* advise their own agencies and staff on this evaluation as well as coordinating agencyinternal substantive feedback back to the group
* ensure that field representatives are aware of the TEC and fully involved and available to contribute to the evaluation

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* participate in any workshop that may be planned once the draft report has been received.

#### Role of the thematic working groups (e.g. Capacities Thematic Working Group)

In addition, a number of agencies and donors have signed up to participate in this evaluation. While not part of the ESC, these theme members are expected to provide support to the thematic evaluations as follows:

* provide funding for this evaluation
* provide technical advice or staff on secondment
* provide comments on the inception report and on the draft report(s)
* ensure that field representatives are aware of the TEC and fully involved and available to contribute to this evaluation and related workshops
* provide in-kind support at country level (that is, facilitate meetings, transport, contacts)
* advise their own agencies and staff on this evaluation as well as coordinating agency-

# internal substantive feedback back to the group

* if possible, participate in any workshops planned as part of the evaluation.

#### Role of the TEC evaluation advisor and coordinator (EAC)

The EAC will provide methodological and substantive advice to the evaluation team through the steering committee and the evaluation team leader. The EAC will promote connectivity between this evaluation and the other evaluation exercises undertaken by the TEC, alerting the evaluation team members to any additional information they may need for undertaking their work (eg third-party evaluation reports, lessons-learned events, etc). The EAC will be in regular contact with the evaluation team leader. Any joint workshops, in particular the start-up workshops, would be organised and facilitated by the EAC in collaboration with the evaluation team leaders. The EAC reports to the TEC Core Management Group.

#### Role of the TEC Core Management Group (CMG)

The CMG provides general guidance for the TEC and seeks to ensure complementarity and connectivity between the various thematic evaluations. The CMG will be advised by the EAC and will review and comment on any outputs produced by the thematic evaluation. Responsibility for the quality and acceptance of the report rests with the commissioning agency/ steering committee.

#### Role of the evaluation team leader

The evaluation team leader will report to the thematic ESC for the evaluation. S/he will be in regular contact with the EAC, coordinate mission timing and key events with the EAC as part of the TEC initiative and seek the EAC’s advice when needed. The team leader is responsible for the team’s report(s) as well as for contributing inputs to the TEC synthesis report. This will require participation in a synthesis workshop to be held in December 2005 ,as well as providing written feedback on the draft synthesis report as it relates to this theme.

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#### Role of the Online Forum (www.tsunami-evaluation.org)

The Online Forum links thematic evaluations, posts all ToR, maps all evaluation and lessons exercises, and provides an online forum for each thematic evaluation working group.

### Appendix B: Key questions to be used in the evaluation

#### Background

* What is the ‘disaster history’ of each case-study country, particularly with respect to the affected areas?
* How much did international actors know of the historical processes that had shaped and configured risk in each context?
* To what extent were local organisations experienced in managing disaster risks and in recovery?
* To what extent were local/national resources adequate to meet the needs of the affected populations? (For example, what were the capacities of the local and national actors to coordinate, plan and implement relief and recovery efforts, consult the affected population, differentiate between the needs of women, men, children and the elderly, advocate among external partners, and train those affected to cope with the disaster.)

#### Relevance/appropriateness

* To what extent was the response based on needs assessment for relief and recovery, including an assessment of the needs of different groups in the community? Did the needs assessments include an assessment of local response capacities, including the different capacity of women, men and other vulnerable groups? If not, why?
* How adequate are existing policies for engagement in differentiating between the needs of different groups among affected populations?
* How did international actors determine their priorities for engagement with local and national capacities? (Through agency mandates, consideration of vulnerable groups, etc.)
* Were these priorities re-assessed at different phases of the response to remain relevant in a fluid situation?
* To what extent did international actors’ perceptions of the affected areas correspond with those of the local actors? Were there mechanisms in place to discuss these?
* To what extent did international actors have an understanding of organisation and decision-making structures at government, local government and community level?
* Who did the international agencies engage with and why? Which individuals (women, men, IDPs) and which organisations (including women’s organisations) were targeted?
* To what extent did the international efforts recognise the local context (existing conflicts, tensions, inequalities, coping mechanisms of women and men, and opportunistic capacities that surface in response to the urgency of the situation) and existing indigenous capacities?

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* What were the approaches used by international agencies?
* What attention did international agencies and national organisations pay to the gender composition of their teams, and their capacity to address gender issues?
* How well did beneficiaries (women, men, boys, girls, the elderly) understand international relief mechanisms and how to make best use of them?
* How well did international and national actors take into account the impact of their assistance on local markets in their planning?

#### Efficiency

* To what extent had institutional and legislative arrangements been put in place to deal with disaster response?
* Given the local capacities of different individuals and groups when the tsunami struck, how effectively did international engagement work to strengthen those capacities, given the constraints of needing to deliver relief quickly to affected communities?
* To what extent did the international efforts leverage existing local and national capacities, both at the level of accessing services and information, and also in terms of providing necessary services and opportunities for relief and recovery?
* How well did different actors plan and coordinate among their efforts? Was there duplication of, or gaps in, capacity?
* To what extent did local and international actors support each other to include vulnerable groups, such as women, children and the poorest?
* Did international efforts utilise relevant past experience and evaluations of disaster preparedness and response, including the different needs of women and men?

#### Effectiveness

* How was the performance of existing local institutions (government and nongovernment) with a mandate to provide post-disaster relief?[[20]](#footnote-20)
* What was the impact of previous capacity building on the tsunami response and recovery?
* How effective were international actors in meeting their own priorities for engaging with different groups of local and national actors?
* Did the relief and recovery efforts utilise or displace local capacity among different groups of the affected population? How was the impact of different groups assessed?
* Did international actors have the intention of building capacity during the relief phase?

#### Impact

* How did the capacities of different groups of beneficiaries change throughout the period under review (in terms of both provision of services and ability to access them)
* To what extent did international efforts strengthen/weaken capacities of local and national actors (differentiating between different groups of the affected population) to deliver services and opportunities for relief, recovery and risk reduction?

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* To what extent did international efforts strengthen/weaken the capacities of local and national actors (differentiating between different groups of the affected population) to participate in, and own the relief and recovery efforts?
* To what extent did international efforts strengthen/weaken the capacities of male and female beneficiaries to access relief, rehabilitation and development services and opportunities?
* What has been the different experience of women and men, and how have gender relations, and women’s and men’s capacities, been affected (positively or negatively) by tsunami assistance (both national and international assistance)?
* To what extent did the efforts aim to strengthen synergies between local and national capacities to provide services?
* Did the response activities lessen or exacerbate existing conflicts, including domestic violence, and thereby assist or weaken capacities to respond?
* Has the capacity of local and national actors to use international or national standards for disaster response been enhanced?
* How were markets for affected and non-affected populations impacted by the influx of relief goods and services?
* What kinds of impacts did the efforts, launched prior to the tsunami, to build capacity in disaster-risk management have on the post-tsunami operations?

#### Sustainability/connectedness

* Was there local ownership of provision of relief and recovery efforts and access to these services, and if so, by whom? To what extent did beneficiary groups, local organisations

and the state participate in the decision-making processes related to relief and recovery efforts? Were women and men equally involved, and were their voices and different concerns heard? Were all key groups, including women’s organisations, included?

* Drawing on the lessons learned from past emergencies, and evaluations of the tsunami response already completed, how will current and planned activities in tsunami-affected countries affect local capacity among different members of the population?
* Is a commitment to capacity strengthening among all sections of society explicit within transition and recovery plans and programmes (for both national and international players)? How well do these reflect local needs? What are the chances of their being successful, in the light of the tsunami experience to date?

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#### Future planning and capacity strengthening

The following questions should also be considered, in the light of lessons from responses to the questions above.

* What lessons and good/best practice can be drawn from a comparison between those countries where there had been a process of capacity building in disaster-risk management before the tsunami with those where this had not taken place?
* Are there more effective steps toward better preparedness to manage future disasters?
* Could the international agencies have taken different steps to improve the effectiveness of their efforts?
* Are there identifiable benchmarks for positive changes in capacities to access and deliver services?
* How can the different needs of women and men be identified and taken into account?

# Annex 2: Indonesia report – executive summary

## **By Elisabeth Scheper with inputs from Smruti Patel and Arjuna Parakrama**

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The 26 December earthquake shifted the tectonic plates and pushed down the whole coastal shelf of northern Sumatra, with dramatic consequences. It caused a series of tsunami waves, measuring up to 12 metres high along the southern Aceh Jaya district, leading to massive death and destruction in Aceh and North Sumatra provinces and elsewhere along the Indian Ocean. Being closest to the earthquake epicentre, the devastation in Indonesia was the worst of any affected country: 127,358 persons lost their lives, some 93,662 remain missing and some 533,770 were displaced. The death toll In Indonesia amounts to nearly 80 per cent of all tsunami victims, and 47 per cent of those internally displaced are also in Indonesia. Another severe earthquake hit the region on 28 March 2005, resulting in additional extensive structural damage on the islands off the Aceh coast, including Nias, and resulting in the loss of a further 893 lives.

The tsunami also had long-term consequences. Large stretches of coastal land were washed away or sank, and are now flooded at high tide or even permanently. Rebuilding communities and livelihoods in these locations is not feasible without complex coastal-protection infrastructure, and entire communities need to be relocated. Approximately 40 per cent of private-sector losses occurred in the housing sector. An estimated 25 per cent of the labour force lost jobs in the tsunami aftermath, raising the total unemployment rate to over 30 per cent in the disaster area.

## Capacities before the tsunami

One of Indonesia’s poorest provinces, despite offshore oil and gas exploitation, Aceh has an economy based on rural subsistence farming and fishing. Informal community groups related to mosques help to build local self-sufficiency. Nias Island is one of the least developed regions in Indonesia. It has suffered long-term neglect, compounded by geographical isolation and economic and political marginalisation of the island and its predominantly Christian inhabitants. The protracted conflict between the government and an armed separatist movement in Aceh, together with prolonged periods of martial law, had reduced the capacity of provincial authorities before the tsunami. Combined with restrictions on the media and civil society, this had undermined public confidence in the government. At the time of the tsunami there was a developing momentum toward peace.

Due to the conflict and resulting inaccessibility, very few international agencies were present immediately before the tsunami . Some had previously worked in Aceh, but had withdrawn after the re-imposition of martial law in 2003. The limited number of local nongovernment organisations (NGOs) was focused mainly on advocacy and human rights, as mobilising communities for development work was not permitted. Women in the east and central parts of Aceh suffered greatly from the conflict.

## National and international capacity

The Indonesian national government was ill equipped to address the immediate relief needs in Aceh and Nias effectively, because of remoteness, weak local government capacity and the scale and scope of the tsunami. The National Disaster Management Board (BAKORNAS) had an ad hoc disaster management structure in place with special boards at provincial and district levels, but no contingency plans. It was unable to provide the much-needed operational capacity and coordination for the national and international responses. The official disaster management structures at provincial and district levels were literally wiped out by the tsunami, while the national coordination procedures were unclear to both national and international actors, making the initial relief response ineffective.

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In the absence of national coordination capacity, on-the-ground international agencies were left to initiate and coordinate their immediate relief response in Aceh and Nias, but most international aid agencies had no prior work experience in Aceh and did not have contextual knowledge and stakeholder networks. This made it difficult to assess capacities of local stakeholders. Under severe pressure to deliver swift relief assistance to the displaced survivors, the vast majority of international actors opted for operational programmes and flew in large numbers of humanitarian-sector specialists to assess and address the perceived immediate needs. While this decision facilitated a faster response in the earliest phases, it proved an inappropriate and unsustainable approach in the transition to recovery and reconstruction.

The high staff turnover hampered the ability of international agencies to build institutional memory, in terms of both contextual knowledge and relationships. To implement large operational programmes, international agencies acquired contextual knowledge and local language skills as they worked, by hiring Acehenese staff from local organisations attracted by higher salaries and challenging programmes. This ‘brain drain’ weakened the capacity of local organisation, which had already incurred dramatic human and physical losses in the tsunami. This negatively affected the efficiency and ownership of recovery programmes and slowed down the commencement of transition from the recovery phase to reconstruction and development. In Nias, an additional cultural insensitivity was noted, as from the majority of local staff of international agencies had Islamic backgrounds, and were unfamiliar with the specific Christian cultural context of the island.

## Local capacities

Given the sheer scale of the disaster, the loss of leadership and the collapse of government institutions, communities effectively coped on their own in the first days after the disaster. In the wake of the tsunami, survivors sought refuge at higher altitudes and lived on fruits and coconuts in Aceh Jaya, or were taken in by family and neighbours in urban settings in Aceh Besar. Depending on the proximity to the capital and the scale of the destruction, it took humanitarian workers between one (Banda Aceh) and ten days (Krueng Sabee) to reach the affected communities. Villages and towns with strong leadership initiated rescue and relief efforts before the arrival of external assistance, aided by the Acehenese tradition of gotong royong (voluntary mutual assistance). While relations with local government were strained, community cohesion and horizontal social capital had remained strong.

With limited involvement in the planning of aid programmes, village leaders were disempowered. In field visits to Aceh Jaya, Pidi, Aceh Besar and Nias, a general breakdown of communication between international agencies and local communities was observed. Overwhelmed by new obligations and responsibilities in the tsunami recovery process, such as multiple land disputes and planning decisions, local leaders expressed an urgent need to interact more with international agencies. This would strengthen their planning capacities and help build horizontal and vertical social capital. More effective coordination and a holistic approach to dealing with the problems of inaccessible and isolated communities have been identified as key areas for improvement in the international response.

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Three vulnerable claim-holder categories can be identified as being particularly vulnerable: remote communities with minimal service provision pre-tsunami, communities affected by deadly conflict, and vulnerable women such as those in poor, female-headed households and war widows. The emphasis on relief and recovery in the international response generally left the needs of vulnerable people under-resourced in the first eight months. The focus on formal housing and livelihoods tended to miss out the poorest households that do not usually possess formal land titles to their homes and are self-employed. While these vulnerable groups were provided for in camps or temporary shelters, not many recovery projects had been initiated specifically for the informal sector and for squatter communities.

In remote underdeveloped coastal zones in Aceh and Nias, it proved hard to implement large-scale reconstruction projects, as basic infrastructure was lacking even before the tsunami and the population lived in small, dispersed coastal settlements. Many remote, marginal fishing communities were without any form of assistance. To reach and rebuild such deprived tsunami-affected communities, a more flexible approach based on partnership agreements with CBOs is indispensable. Flexibility is needed in dealing with conflict-affected communities, where it may be counter-productive to make distinctions in terms of absolute need between the tsunami-affected coastal and conflict-affected inland areas. The economies of these communities are interlinked, as goods produced in one area are brought to markets in the other. Therefore, inland communities should also be considered as being affected by the tsunami and should be included in the reconstruction programming. Difference in standards and timelines between tsunami and conflict-recovery programmes could, if not carefully managed, unintentionally exacerbate inequalities and tensions.

## Quality and accountability

At the time the evaluation was conducted, the public accountability of the international efforts towards intended beneficiaries appeared virtually non-existent. An indicator of this is the difficulty the evaluation team encountered in obtaining project documents, budgets and progress reports. Various initiatives may start to remedy this in the future. The UNDP Development Assistance Database system is designed to document donor involvement in the reconstruction phase although this was not operational at the time of the evaluation. Also, BRR (the government agency in charge of recovery and reconstruction) is expected to play a broker role in the planning and monitoring of the reconstruction process. This should increase public transparency. International agencies have begun to consider alternative forms of public accountability, commensurate with their current role.

The role of the media in advocacy for vulnerable groups is much less prominent in Aceh and Nias, than in Sri Lanka and Thailand. Years of protracted conflict have restricted freedom of expression and many affected districts are without newspapers and TV coverage. To overcome the information and communication gap, more international assistance should be provided to facilitate the flow of information, for example through the rehabilitation of radio services, wall newspapers and news booths. National advocacy NGOs play an increasingly prominent watchdog role to advocate for rights of women and of vulnerable groups, especially related to issues such as land rights, forced relocation, corruption and traditional interpretations of the Shari’a law.

## Conclusions

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International tsunami assistance had a positive effect on the peace and governance situation in Aceh province. This has not been entirely intended, and has not been strategically exploited to the full, as yet. The international aid-agency presence exposes the hitherto closed region to new participatory development approaches and good governance concepts, which may have a positive impact on downward accountability and inclusive, rights-based development processes in the new autonomous region of Aceh. The new political space needs to be actively recognised and utilised by international agencies involved in the tsunami response, as the window of opportunity is potentially narrow.

Specific gender-based needs were identified in most assessments, yet few gender-sensitive approaches were observed in the housing and livelihood-recovery programmes. However, both international agencies and local NGOs with a specific women’s mandate have developed interesting pilot initiatives that can serve as models for improved women’s involvement in the reconstruction phase.

The need for mutually accountable partnerships between international and local actors was increasingly acknowledged at the time of the evaluation. While the initial tsunami response was highly appreciated, frustration and disappointment among civil-society organisations and beneficiaries has grown during the recovery phase. Housing and livelihood projects have been slow and there has been limited participation of local communities in recovery programmes. To reach the most vulnerable communities, international actors need to rely on and invest in local organisations, and to strengthen their capacity as key actors in a sustainable development process. Hopefully, this will end the systematic exclusion of and discrimination against marginal rural communities in the long term.

Lastly, the massive international tsunami response exposed structural weaknesses in the humanitarian aid systems that provide valuable lessons for work in future disasters. More creativity and flexibility is required to engage national and local capacities in the recovery process, and in building skills for disaster-risk reduction. Given the vulnerability to natural disasters of Aceh and Nias Island, the awareness and planning of both government and international aid agencies for programming to reduce disaster risk was surprisingly low at all levels.

## Recommendations to international agencies

### 1 Sustained and respectful engagement with local and national capacities

* Recognise and validate national and local capacities in the local context at individual and institutional level in the immediate recovery phase.
* Foster mutually beneficial partnerships and reduce the dependence on foreign experts through enhancing skills to identify local and national capacities.
* Enhance contextual knowledge within international agencies and increase community participation in accordance with international standards.
* Provide institutional support to CBOs including capacity strengthening to repair ‘braindrain’ damage, and apply fair grant-making standards.
* Initiate preparatory work in advance of the crises in order to improve significantly the quality of an emergency response at the local, national and international levels.
* Develop basic elements of an appropriate community-based, disaster-preparedness plan in partnership with local communities, local and national governments to build relevant local capacities to reduce vulnerability to future disasters.

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### 2 Equity, inclusion and downward accountability

* Reach vulnerable groups that are overlooked in the current programme of asset replacement, especially in remote, under-resourced areas affected by the tsunami in Nias, Aceh Jaya and east Aceh.
* Incorporate valuable experiences of local pilot projects, the better to address specific problems facing women, such as land ownership, inheritance and Shari’a interpretations, and to support women affected by both conflict and tsunami, and lacking access to information.
* Strengthen the role of the media as an independent monitor in Aceh and Nias.
* Establish a system for public information and accountability, boosting the opportunities for claim-holders to set their own agenda.

### 3 Fostering an enabling policy framework and safe environment

* Develop more creativity and flexibility in humanitarian relief systems to engage local capacities of vulnerable groups and meet their specific needs.
* Strategically utilise the new political space in Aceh province to strengthen indirectly the peace and democratisation process.
* Improve cross-fertilisation of tsunami- and conflict-recovery programmes in order to guarantee equal standards and timelines, and avoid tensions that could exacerbate inequalities and endanger the peace process.

# Annex 3: Maldives report – executive summary

**By Smruti Patel with contributions from Janey Lawry White**

## Purpose of the review

The overall purpose of the evaluation is to determine the impact of the tsunami response, notably the response of international actors, on local and national capacities for relief, recovery and risk reduction.

More specifically, this evaluation seeks to:

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* assess how local and national capacities changed as a result of the tsunami response
* assess how well international actors engaged with local and national capacities in providing relief and recovery assistance
* assess the intended and unintended changes to local and national capacities as a result of the tsunami response by international actors
* assess the extent to which transition/recovery/risk reduction programming, planned and implemented, is likely to influence local and national capacities
* distil lessons learned for efforts to strengthen local and national capacities for future crisis response and recovery
* retain a gender perspective throughout and highlight the varied experiences and perspectives of women and men.

## The Maldives review

Within the capacities evaluation, Indonesia and Sri Lanka have been studied in more depth than Thailand and the Maldives. Because of wider TEC deadlines, the Maldives field study was limited to 10 days from 4 to 14 November 2005. This short time was all the more brief because of the time taken to travel between the atolls and islands. The field visit furthermore coincided with the end of Ramadan and other official holidays, while many interlocutors were on leave. This report is presented as a reflective review rather than a comprehensive evaluation. Lack of time allowed for only qualitative methods. The key observations in this report were presented in Male during a debriefing at the end of the field visit.

## The setting

The Maldives is made up of small islands, with a small but highly dispersed population and a very specific geography. The shortage of domestic resources means that many items have to be imported. The strong overall economic growth of the Maldives in recent decades has been accompanied by growing regional disparities and by a lack of investment in diverse skills and competencies for development. Skill shortages have often been met by foreign labour. Prior to the tsunami, the ability to access services and opportunities was constrained not only by geography, but also by a strongly centralised public administration. For women, further constraints were imposed by social norms and the fact that there is a remarkably high level of households that are headed by women. The ability to access information, to demand quality services, and to hold to account was constrained by a centralised and topdown style of governance. Atoll and island chiefs are nominated by the centre rather than elected by the local population. There now appears to be a willingness to pursue political reforms, partly as a result of the tsunami disaster, but this will inevitably be a slow process.

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The tsunami was the first major disaster to hit the Maldives. The Maldives suffered relatively lowlosses in terms of human lives, but its national economy has been hit much harder than that of any other affected country, and this will affect the country’s ability to recover. Despite years of concern about the potential effects of climate change and the rising level of the sea, there was no significant disaster preparedness at national or local levels before the tsunami. There was no policy, no legal or institutional framework or disaster-management expertise. There was also no Red Cross/Crescent society. There were very few international assistance actors at the time of the tsunami, notably the UN agencies, and with a focus on development rather than disasters. Very few Maldivian organisations can count as NGOs with national reach, but there is a wide range of community-based associations. Some of these have relevant experience and skills but few has experience in designing or managing large projects.

## The relief phase

Were the relief programmes, from a capacity perspective, relevant, appropriate and effective? It is not possible to answer such a question beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of a 10-day visit some nine months after the event. Nevertheless there are some major observations that can be made with reasonable confidence, supported both by documentary sources and by the interviews conducted during the field visit.

1. From a technical-logistical point of view, the relief operation seems to have been reasonably successful. While the local population spontaneously responded to the situation in the first few days, inter-island communications were quickly restored and relief supplies started coming in.[[21]](#footnote-21) The assistance by several foreign navies seems to have been relevant and effective. Although there are some indications that relief items were not always appropriate, and that there might have been some discrimination and possibly corruption, it does not appear that there were major gaps.

**Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities**

1. The government acted very quickly to set up its Task Force and a National Disaster Management Centre. The Tsunami Relief and Rehabilitation Fund seems to have been relevant and well-functioning. Given the lack of in-house experience, international support to strengthen the capacity of these institutions, and of the different line ministries, seems relevant and appropriate. Some questions can legitimately be raised about ‘cost-effectiveness’ of this support and its appropriateness in such unusual terrain.
2. Assessments seem to have been more problematic. Although the point has been made several times in the international humanitarian literature that a good assessment looks at needs but also at capacities, and though there exist specific tools such as

Vulnerabilities and Capacities Assessments, it appears that neither the national nor the international actors paid much attention to existing capacities. Given that quite a number of initial assessments were carried out through the existing public administration infrastructure, with requests from the centre in Malé being replied to by (overwhelmingly male) Atoll and Island chiefs, this is perhaps not too surprising. But international agencies should have been quicker to pick up on this.

1. Perhaps because the relief operation was largely carried out by military/security personnel and through the public administration, there seems to have been very little effort to provide information and to solicit and listen to peoples’ views, priorities, concerns and complaints.

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## Transition to recovery

A too-technical-logistical approach to relief delivery often sets a tone for the wider attitudes, relationships and strategies during the reconstruction and recovery phase, unless specific and concentrated efforts are made to reverse this. International aid agencies are by and large not very good at this, and we see that such efforts have also been slow and hesitant in the Maldives.

1. For the first eight to nine months after the tsunami, international agencies have tended to mirror the national set-up, i.e. highly centralised, top-down and dominated by a Malé (and predominantly male) perspective. It is only eight to nine months after the disaster that there is emerging recognition of the need to more directly engage with local level structures and with the affected populations and intended beneficiaries.
2. There are still few systematic efforts to provide relevant, accurate and timely information to the target groups, nor enough clear and effective mechanisms for them to voice their views, concerns and complaints. Some agency staff expressed the belief that people on the islands are passive, which does not correspond to the articulate and critical people whom we encountered during our island visits.
3. There also seems to be a belief that there is little or no capacity at local level. International agencies have sought to contain rather than solve the problem by importing competencies, and by providing short and somewhat ad hoc training. If too many trainees are from Malé this may only reinforce the already existing inequalities.
4. There has been continued marginalisation of women and longer-term displaced people and perhaps a lack of attention to the perspectives of children and of youth.
5. A very positive contribution by the international assistance community has been the raising of awareness about the rights and entitlements of IDPs and international standards. But there remain major shortcomings in providing the IDPs with adequate protection and adequate information.
6. The restoration of income and/or a regular livelihood is a top priority for disaster affected people and a major means to reinforce their capacity to cope. Cash-for-work projects and investments in the fisheries sector are evidently very important for many households but income generating activities of women have tended to get overlooked.
7. Shelter programmes are progressing more slowly than originally planned. This is a situation that requires concerted information and communication efforts.
8. Psycho-social support programmes could not be fully assessed but clearly there is a need to focus on the long-term IDPs for whom the uncertainty and lack of information is depressing. Some interlocutors suggested that more attention should be given to local and traditional ways of coping.
9. A strategic approach to create a comprehensive multi-hazard risk management capacity in the Maldives seems to be underway.

## Overview

The destruction in the Maldives created a longer-term development reversal rather than a major humanitarian crisis. The need for relief was short-lived. The relief operation appears to have gone reasonably well with relevant capacity-support to the national authorities. Arguably more capacity support during the relief phase should have been provided to Atoll and Island administrations and effective information mechanisms that reached the affected populations should have been set up from the very beginning.

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The performance of the subsequent international assistance for recovery and future disaster preparedness needs to be appreciated against the pre-existing context: a governance style and system that was centralised and top-down and did not encourage participatory approaches; a lack of skilled people; and no effective disaster preparedness. In addition there were intense pressures within the international community (donors, media, the donating public) to spend and rebuild quickly. This created conflicting incentives. Transforming these situations does not happen within the span of a year. It would therefore be unfair to criticise the aid community and the national authorities for not having already made greater impact in this regard. Our main criticism is that it has taken the international agencies much longer than was justified, six to seven months at least, to move out of relief mode. This may be a global problem in humanitarian response and not specific to performance in the Maldives.

The persistence of sectoral rather than more integrated or holistic approaches is one indicator that programming is still not fully in developmental mode. While capacitystrengthening has now come much more clearly on the agenda of the international agencies, further thought should be given to the objectives and methods. Whose capacities should be considered and for what?

## Recommendations to the international agencies

**1 Capacity-strengthening of the public sector, civil society and population should become an explicit programme with emphasis on inclusion, equity and risk reduction.**

* There is opportunity to link the tsunami recovery strategy to the wider national development challenges. Issues such as regional inequalities, the roles and responsibilities of the public and the private sector, the opportunity cost of investing **Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities** heavily in future tsunami preparedness, and the structural marginalisation of women need to be considered.
* Development debates about issues such as the Focus Island strategy should not be kept within elite policy circles. International agencies have a role to play in encouraging more public information and public participation.
* There should be a shift from sectoral to more integrated developmental approaches.
* Civil society should be supported in a constructive manner. There is, for example, interest among Maldivian organisations in the idea of creating a national federation of NGOs. It should be clearly understood that government, non-governmental actors and international agencies each have their strengths and can play complementary roles. The current political reforms provide an opportunity but naturally create apprehensions and resistances. The attitude of the international community in this regard could help to reduce apprehensions in the government about allowing more space to nongovernmental actors.

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* International actors could also support communication between civil society organisations and the central government about the actual progress, impacts and consequences of national recovery policies and strategies.

**2 More strategic and comprehensive engagement of national and local organisational capacities to provide an enabling environment.**

* Capacity-strengthening efforts should continue to be broadened beyond the central government to Atoll and Island administrations, development committees, women’s development committees, IDP committees and community-based associations. This should include opportunities for members of these various entities in different atolls of the Maldives to meet, discuss and exchange experiences and also to meet up with comparable entities in other affected countries.
* Learn more about local contexts and power dynamics. There may be a tendency to depict the structures and dynamics of all atolls and islands as basically similar but this is not necessarily the case. Each zone and location has its own smaller or bigger history, and its own social, economic and political dynamics.[[22]](#footnote-22)
* Such organisational capacity strengthening efforts should not be focused on project administration competencies but on inclusive and participatory approaches and of transparent and responsive approaches.[[23]](#footnote-23)
* Conduct a focused cross-agency review of ‘capacity-assessment’ and ‘capacity-building’ methods, strategies and their effectiveness.
* Focused reflection and possibly redefinition of the roles and responsibilities of technical private sector contractors around the issue of participation.

**3 More vigorous support to affected and vulnerable people so that they can assert their independence and ability to hold others accountable.**

* More emphasis on income generation and livelihood opportunities.
* Systematic and sustained information strategies targeted at affected people and intended beneficiaries about the assistance programmes, their intent, criteria, progress and delays. The Maldives media should also be considered a mechanism to encourage wider and informed public debate.
* Focused efforts to actively engage women, children, youth, longer-term displaced people and poor households, and to build their knowledge and confidence to speak up.
* Active involvement of the long-term IDPs in the analysis and debates about return and/or resettlement options and in the design of new settlements and services.
* Establish more structured mechanisms through which people can effectively transmit their views, needs, concerns and complaints to duty-holders and decision-makers.
* Periodic reviews of programmes and policies involving the affected population and intended beneficiaries along the lines of social audit.

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# Annex 4: Sri Lanka report – executive summary

**By Arjuna Parakrama with contributions from Elisabeth Scheper and Sudarshana Gunawardena**

## Introduction

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The December 2004 tsunami, triggered by a massive earthquake off the coast of Sumatra, was the worst natural disaster in living memory in Sri Lanka. The challenge of the relief, recovery and reconstruction remained enormous alongside the most impressive show of human kindness and sharing demonstrated by local people in the immediate aftermath. Vulnerable groups, such as poor fisherfolk living close to the shore in simple houses and shelters, have borne the brunt of the negative impacts. Coastal communities are comparatively poor in the Sri Lankan context (25–33 per cent of the affected population lived below the poverty line) and the tsunami compounded previously existing vulnerabilities. The northeast is the region worst affected by the tsunami.

Just as the tsunami itself was without precedent, so too was the speed, breadth and magnitude of international support for the survivors in Sri Lanka. This abundance, even excess, of resources created a new experience for the international agencies engaged in the tsunami response. International NGOs were able to obtain funds directly from the (first-world) general public and, therefore, became less dependent on traditional (bilateral) institutional donors. Here, then, was an unprecedented opportunity to respond to this complex humanitarian emergency, without the usual debilitating resource constraints. For once, international NGOs had the luxury of designing and implementing programmes as they wished, which, coupled with the learning from Rwanda and elsewhere, provided an opportunity to demonstrate best practice in the humanitarian sector, thereby silencing critics of the international system. Thus, very early on in the crisis, it became clear that the established humanitarian relief system was being tested in the crucible of the Indian Ocean tsunami response.

However, with the increase in resources came an equivalent increase in profile and public visibility. The Western members of the public wanted to know how their money was being spent. The media followed up with detailed stories from the affected areas, including assessments on the three-month and six-month anniversaries. Agencies faced pressure to scale up immediately to include new sectors and geographical areas, and to adopt new administrative regimes in order to spend the additional money received. These sectors often transcended the agencies’ proven specialisations, the areas included some outside the staffs’ ability to respond effectively, and the regimes included procedures that further centralised decision-making in the name of speed and efficiency.

The Sri Lankan country study is one of four undertaken by the TEC local and national capacities evaluation, which in turn is one of five evaluations undertaken by the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC). The purpose of the evaluation is to ‘determine the impact of the international tsunami response on local and national capacities for relief and recovery, and risk reduction’. The international team consisted of Arjuna Parakrama and Elisabeth Scheper. This evaluation is based not only on consultations with formal stakeholders in government and aid agencies but also on a survey of more than a thousand claim-holders in affected communities. For further background to the evaluation, see the regional report. A summary of findings from the Sri Lanka survey of claim-holders is presented as Annex 7 below.

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The capacities evaluation in Sri Lanka seeks to assess how the spectrum of international actors and their national partners fared in engaging with local and national capacities to deliver goods and services, in enhancing the access of affected populations to the relief and recovery process, and in enabling them to hold duty-bearers accountable to claim-holders. All this is mediated through the lens of local and national capacities. Capacities to deliver, provide, address, absorb and articulate are well known, but capacities to recognise and nurture are less well understood, and still less studied are those capacities which serve to resist elite capture at all levels and among all stakeholders. Capacities are not sets of abstract or context-independent aptitudes and skills that are reducible to technical criteria, but, rather, can be seen to be played out within a complex political economy that is mediated by unequal power relations. In summary, local capacities cannot be understood as neutral in relation to context or culture, and require a safe environment for their articulation.

## Findings

The overall finding of the claim-holder survey in Sri Lanka is declining satisfaction with the tsunami response (Figure A4.1).

In relation to the different actors, findings are:

### International agencies

* Fund-raising appeals led to unprecedented donations for tsunami aid, but put high pressure on delivery and capacity to scale up capacity.
* Serious contradictions exist between the normal programming of aid agencies and their tsunami response in terms of planning processes, community participation, gendersensitivity and targeting of marginal groups.
* Pressure to spend has favoured capital-intensive programmes to the potential detriment of more sustainable livelihood initiatives and partnership opportunities with local organisations.

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| **Figure A4.1: Assessment of tsunami response performance during the first week, three months, eight months, and overall** |
| **0**  **10**  **15**  **20**  **25**  **30**  **35**  **40**  **45**  **%**  **Good**  **Bad**  **5**  **First**  **Three**  **Eight**  **Overall**  **week months months** |

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* Aid has not been distributed according to need: for example, more assistance for fisheries sector over others; within the fishing sector, there was concentration on boats not nets, boat-owners not wage labourers; and support was unevenly divided between districts.
* Inappropriate recruitment procedures with a focus on technical skills rather than contextual knowledge.
* Problems in the transition from relief to recovery, with insufficient attention to development issues.
* Tensions between imperatives to nurture participation in decision-making (including abiding by decisions taken by national and local stakeholders) and international standards (including those on building on local capacity, non-discrimination and gender sensitivity) constrain the effectiveness of international agencies.

### National government

* National government had insufficient capacity, understanding and human resources to deal with multi-agency response.
* Personal commitment was shown by local officials but they were disempowered by the central level.
* Differences in resource allocation and policy implementation raised questions about government intentions, particularly in conflict-sensitive areas.
* Confusion and lack of transparency over key policy issues, such as the coastal buffer zone, have debilitated both the relief and recovery phases.
* Major communication and information-sharing problems occurred between government agencies and with the international community.

### Local government

* Roles of national, provincial and district government in capacity strengthening need streamlining and joint planning to make these efforts more sustainable.
* Innovative and people-sensitive local officials need to be supported by the system, not penalised or placed at risk, particularly in conflict areas.
* District government needs more structural capacity-building support to absorb new personnel, fill positions and face new challenges.
* The lack of accurate data make planning, coordination and monitoring extremely difficult, while existing data are insufficiently used.
* Separation between tsunami, conflict recovery and development funds and their different timeframes, prevent strategic and holistic reconstruction programming.
* A comprehensive plan and funding is needed to resolve the land-acquisition issues that have been slowing down the shelter programmes for the displaced.
* Awareness and planning for disaster-risk preparedness programming in tsunami reconstruction is minimal at all levels.

### Community leadership and community-based organisations (CBOs)

* Empowered and articulate CBOs and their leaders are not treated with due respect by some national and international agencies.

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* There is a need to build accountable partnership relations, instead of sub-contracting.
* There was a lack of information-sharing, and basic consultation processes in community programmes implemented by international agencies disempowered local leaders.
* The continuation of cash-for-work programmes beyond the initial emergency phase requires systematic analysis to determine their impact on the local economy and the possibility of corruption.
* Changing conflict and political dynamics force changes in governance approach, from control to participation and accountability, and vice versa.
* Faced by new obligations and responsibilities such as multiple land disputes, planning decisions and the peace process, local leaders will need to interact more with international agencies in the tsunami recovery process.
* There has been inadequate targeting of marginal groups within communities.
* The tsunami response has tended to exacerbate regional disparities and perceptions of grievance among ethnic groups.
* Discrepancies in the treatment of conflict-affected and tsunami-affected communities have resulted in a lost opportunity.
* International agencies could use this opportunity to build or strengthen civil society, especially in the field of participatory community development and grassroots mobilisation.
* CBOs specialised in advocacy and peacebuilding, working in conflict zones mostly, are drawn into community-based recovery programmes, outside their expertise and experience, without adequate support and capacity enhancement.
* There is a huge unmet need for capacity building and institutional development with civil-society organisations due to vast increases in staff, change in structure and approach and expansion into new areas.
* Three-month funding timeframes, monthly reporting, different formats per agency and slow procedures are too cumbersome and hamper institutional development.

### Claim-holders

* There is unintended bias toward richer people, and insufficient inclusion of the most vulnerable, such as landless people, renters and the self-employed affected by the tsunami.
* The TEC survey identified significant dissatisfaction among beneficiaries toward their community leaders, with 28 per cent unhappy with their performance and only 6 per cent happy with it. Reasons for this were found among the qualitative responses and included failure to distribute assistance equally, unfair cash distribution, collection of wrong information, and not recognising people with different opinions.
* Equity and asset-creation principles have been inadequately articulated and remain exceptions even among agencies that implement them elsewhere, thereby marginalising the poorest.
* Women have suffered most from both conflict and tsunami: livelihood programmes should prioritise most vulnerable war and tsunami widows, and actively engage them in the information loop.

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* Conflict-affected and already marginalised districts are suffering from neglect in the tsunami response.
* Lack of participatory policy affects communities adversely and leads to slow overall progress of shelter and livelihood rehabilitation.

### Human resources

* In general, immediate efficiency and delivery were prioritised over sustainability and longer-term capacity strengthening.
* In the international agencies, problems included high staff turnover, inappropriate job profiling, loss of institutional memory, marked disparity in remuneration, ‘poaching’ and conspicuous isolationism through security-related frameworks.
* At the national/provincial level, disparities among national and local staff lead to resentment.
* At the local level, the tsunami response indicated insensitivities to local traditions and culture.

### Unintended bias toward ‘richer’ people

* In the planning phase, the speed and size of programming reduced room for participation of marginalised people. At best, procedures have replaced real participatory processes.
* In the implementation phase, there has been a lack of flexibility to nuance projects to the needs of most vulnerable groups (squatters, tenants, self-employed) and improve their capacity to access services.
* Within monitoring and evaluation, the appropriateness, relevance and effectiveness of assistance to the most vulnerable and marginalised groups are not well monitored.

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The need for more equal distribution of aid emerges strongly in the claim-holder survey (Figure A4.2).

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| **Figure A4.2: What aspects of the international and national tsunami response would you like to see changed?** |
| |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | | **Continue cash assistance Distribute aid equally to all** | | | | **Asign INGO per area**  **More livelihood programmes** | | | | **Can’t say** | | | | **Increase people’s participation** | | | |  | | | |  |  |  |   **% 30**  **25**  **20**  **15**  **10**  **5**  **0** |

### Conclusions

In general, there has been inadequate recognition of the extensive and diverse local and national capacities that exist at both the institutional and individual levels. The international response has not been able to facilitate nascent local capacities in a serious and sustainable manner, nor national capacities beyond providing de-contextualised technical support to engage with these issues, thereby not merely losing an opportunity to link this humanitarian intervention with longer-term structural concerns, but also, in some cases, unintentionally exacerbating inequalities and tensions.

In Sri Lanka, the constant refrain of international NGOs and donor agencies was that humanitarian response and sectoral capacity as well as post-disaster experience was woefully lacking in country, necessitating the ad hoc hiring of international staff on shortterm contracts to perform immediate tasks. Yet, the time taken by these recruits to become familiar with the complex and dynamic local contexts, as well as the costly mistakes precipitated by such ignorance, was not accounted for, nor was the perfectly reasonable alternative used of hiring local staff with appropriate contextual knowledge and then training them in the relevant sectors. Moreover, there is very strong and persistent evidence across the board on the question of ‘poaching’ within the UN system, across international NGOs and between international NGOs and CBOs.

International agencies have gone far beyond their core mandate and competencies. This has been a major obstacle to sustained engagement with local and national capacities. The problem was worsened by an overestimation of international capacity to deliver, coupled with an underestimation of delivery costs. Delays in permanent housing and livelihood support have compounded this problem, even creating serious three-way tension among claim-holders, government and donor agencies.

Considered collectively, the international tsunami response has not demonstrated the capacity to address fundamental issues of equity and inclusion within and across sectors and geographical areas, to utilise gender- and conflict-sensitive approaches, to integrate poverty and marginalisation concerns, and, most importantly, to set in place transparent mechanisms and modalities of accountability to beneficiaries.

The majority of programmes have no specific targeting mechanism and seek to mainstream a uniform response, which may in practice serve only to exclude the most vulnerable and marginalised who are less able to access common services and/or have special needs and constraints. While a few good initiatives have emerged, in general the tsunami response framework in Sri Lanka serves the ‘lowest common denominator’ in the recovery phase, by privileging house-owners and boat-owners. In general, the vulnerable position of women has been acknowledged, but gender-sensitive programming has been inadequate. Often women are the majority of participants, but their decision-making role remains unclear. Gender-based violence is a serious concern throughout the region. The majority of programmes have adopted a ‘gender-neutral’ or ‘gender-blind’ policy, whereas what is required is specific targeting or affirmative action.

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The claim-holder survey indicates that systems of sharing accurate information in a timely and user-friendly manner have not improved in the second and third phases of the tsunami response, when they are even more urgently needed since long-term choices are at stake. Downward accountability and transparency has been almost entirely lacking. International agencies need to ensure accountability through basic practical mechanisms. No significant change has taken place relating to either accountability or transparency in the recovery and rehabilitation phases. The essential conditions for the empowerment of claim-holders include comprehensive information-sharing and setting up appropriate contextually sensitive communication strategies. These need to be addressed through the engagement with and enhancement of local and national capacities to ensure that no unnecessary risks and challenges are imposed on local communities.

## Recommendations to international agencies

* Involve claim-holders in the design, planning, implementation, monitoring and assessment of rehabilitation initiatives in general, but especially in the permanent housing and livelihoods programmes.
* Establish guidelines or a code of conduct that would govern the procedures for recruitment and working conditions of international NGO staff, both local and international, which would include modalities to be adopted regarding employing staff of other agencies and government.
* Adopt the principle of a ‘right to information’ and provide, proactively, accurate, timely and user-friendly information (e.g. translated into the appropriate local language and presented simply and clearly) on a regular basis to all claim-holders to enable them to take informed decisions.
* Ensure transparent and mutually accountable partnerships between donors and local organisations through sharing of budgets (including salaries and overhead costs) and reports.
* Address poverty/equity and conflict/exclusion issues through providing livelihood and housing options to the poorest and conflict-affected people, even if they are not directly affected by the tsunami.
* Address issues of intra-district and inter-district equality through better coordination and greater flexibility of programmes.
* Identify (through participatory processes) the context- and phase-specific needs/rights of vulnerable and marginal groups, including women, the aged and children, and address these needs/rights as matters of the highest priority.
* Facilitate advocacy around issues and concerns of claim-holders, and ensure that their voice is heard at the sub-national and national levels in order to influence policy formulation.
* Adopt a rights-based approach in the humanitarian sector, and develop an agreed code of conduct or guiding principles that incorporate the existing codes and standards.
* Jointly support independent watchdog movements and mechanisms of redressing grievances, and provide them with complete access to all information.

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# Annex 5: Thailand report – executive summary

**By Elisabeth Scheper with inputs from Smruti Patel**

## Introduction

The December 2004 tsunami was the worst natural disaster in Thailand’s history, affecting six provinces along the Andaman coastline: 5,395 people died, 2,817 people disappeared and 8,257 people were seriously injured; 3,302 houses were totally destroyed and 1,503 houses partially damaged; more than 35,000 families lost their livelihoods. The damage was localised and varied from scarcely visible in some areas to total destruction in others.

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Seven unique characteristics of the tsunami response in Thailand affected national and local capacities:

1. Thailand declined international financial assistance, but welcomed specific technical assistance.
2. Because tsunami damage was localised, no large-scale infrastructural reconstruction was required.
3. Thailand activated the 1979 Civil Defence Act, rather than creating a new tsunami coordination office. This freed resources and maximised the capacities of national and local line ministries.
4. The Thai population responded generously with sizable public cash donations and unprecedented donations in cash and kind from the private sector.
5. International agencies providing technical assistance focused on their core mandates of participatory planning, inclusion of vulnerable groups, child protection and disaster-risk reduction.
6. The loss of more than 3,330 foreign lives gave an international presence to the humanitarian effort.
7. The local and international media played an important role in helping beneficiaries acquire more equal access to tsunami assistance and advocating for indigenous rights in land disputes.

This study reviews the impact of the international tsunami response on Thailand’s national and local capacities. Because Thailand declined international financial assistance, the review analyses only government coordination and private-sector response. Given these special circumstances, the review team was reduced to two members, and the timeframe of the mission was limited to 10 days.

### General conclusions

Capacity to deliver: The Thai government led an efficient immediate emergency and earlyrecovery response, including prompt provision of health services, a major forensic operation, construction of temporary shelter and permanent houses, use of military assets to support the tsunami recovery, compensation to survivors, mobilisation of public funds and attention to disaster management.

Eight success factors were identified in interviews with the government, NGOs and UN officials and confirmed by a UN workshop on Best Practices in May 2005:

1. the use of existing systems, such as the Civil Defence Act
2. the central coordinating committees, with different line ministries taking the lead 3 the generosity of the general public and business sector
3. the international pressure on the government to perform well, in view of the large number of foreign victims and displaced tourists
4. clear timeframes and budget lines
5. a strong national government that managed the emergency operation with one voice

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1. support to disaster-preparedness capacities and review of environmental protection policies
2. a long-term reconstruction focus on technical-skill development and ownership.

The national government activated its existing Civil Defence Act emergency system, which successfully mobilised and directed human and financial resources of relevant line ministries to the affected areas. Ad hoc central coordination mechanisms were therefore unnecessary. This made the Thai tsunami response more appropriate than the others reviewed, and added to the efficiency.

In the first and second emergency phases, the strong national level coordination temporarily bolstered the capacity of district authorities to deal with the search, recovery and repatriation of tsunami victims and to provide compensation to the affected population. However, the national tsunami response has not had a lasting impact on capacity. The role of district authorities in the coordination and monitoring of the reconstruction phase is very limited. It further failed to systematically include beneficiaries in the planning and implementation of reconstruction programmes.

The reconstruction and development phase will require a more participatory and rightsbased approach to reach the same levels of efficiency. Strong centralised control worked well in the emergency phase, but tends to overlook the interest of poor communities. Some key concerns in the reconstruction phase include:

* priorities of the medium-scale business community
* land disputes in local communities
* government-provided housing that is not suitable to the livelihoods of poor communities
* individuals affected by the tsunami and engaged in land disputes being dependent on the generosity of NGOs and volunteers
* denial of transitional assistance to unregistered migrant workers.

International agencies efficiently provided technical support in coordination. Because they were not involved in large-scale operational work, they continued to address sensitive issues of community participation and the needs of vulnerable groups. The abundant tsunami donations have given the international agencies a window of opportunity to pilot alternative, sustainable development approaches with communities. However, this window is of limited duration and agencies would do well to give greater emphasis to advocacy with national government in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of tsunami programmes. Some tensions exist among international NGOs, local NGOs and CBOs. Few international agencies have operational programmes in Thailand and concerns about presumed religious activities of international NGOs existed prior to the tsunami.

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**Capacity to acces s :** The capacity of beneficiaries to access services at district and community level is a complex issue requiring further study. Overall, most communities managed to access services from government or other sources with the exception of unregistered migrant workers, who were not entitled to official support and were afraid of deportation. The national government provided temporary shelter within the first month and construction of permanent houses commenced in the second. However, conflicts over land have dominated the rehabilitation process and most government support to affected districts and communities is poorly coordinated at district level. Some communities claim that they have received no assistance, or not to the level of assistance they are entitled. Complaints about corruption of village leaders, adding non-tsunami affected families to the lists, were frequently heard. District offices are understaffed and under-resourced to monitor assistance in the field and have limited insight into the activities undertaken by line ministries.

**Capacity to ensure quality and accountability:** The national tsunami response in Thailand has paid insufficient attention to internal oversight and public accountability. Clear information is lacking on private-sector donations, which are often awarded directly to provinces. Private donations are not publicly accounted for, fuelling suspicions that funds were ‘liberally’ applied. UNDP has initiated a Development Assistance Database, which is expected to make an important contribution to increased transparency of reconstruction and development programmes in the affected areas, but the government and private sector donations were not included in the system and it has not been translated into the Thai language. The media and national human rights NGOs are playing an important role to highlight the plight of the poor and advocate for the most vulnerable, but there is a still an important need to incorporate lessons on exclusion and inequality in the tsunami reconstruction effort. Ethnic and religious balance in the south is fragile and a major contribution of the tsunami reconstruction is to show a new approach to sustainable development.

### Conclusions in relation to core messages

The review identified three cross cutting core messages in relation to international aid:

#### Core message 1: Engage with national and local capacities

The international tsunami response in Thailand focused on technical assistance in two main areas: identification and repatriation of the deceased and assistance in recovery and reconstruction. The largest international forensic operation in history, involving 40 different countries, proved difficult for the Thai government to manage; some teams were unprepared to work in a coordinated fashion. But local forensic expertise has improved and Japan is currently providing technical assistance to train professional search, rescue and recovery teams in each of the six Andaman Coast provinces.

The Thai decision to request only technical assistance had several key aspects:

* provision of technical assistance is de facto aimed at strengthening national and local capacities
* assistance was largely provided by agencies with a long pre-tsunami presence incountry and a good comprehension of the local context, which improved efficiency and connectedness
* technical assistance was in line with the agencies’ core business, which facilitated better linking of contextual and sectoral knowledge
* the impact of the international technical assistance in Thailand is likely larger than elsewhere, as inclusion, equality, accountability and local ownership issues have been consistently addressed.

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This assistance was adjusted appropriately to the shifting needs in the different emergency phases. In the immediate relief phase, UN agencies provided technical and logistical assistance to government authorities while international NGOs catered to the needs of most vulnerable communities excluded from the official response. UNDP assisted in setting up the international coordination committee; UNICEF helped provide immediate immunisation, psychosocial support, repairs and reopening of schools. In the recovery phase, international attention shifted to assessments and participatory planning for reconstruction, safeguarding inclusion of most vulnerable groups. Most international NGOs provided financial support to local NGO networks, while UN agencies addressed inclusion and protection issues.

The third phase of transition from recovery to reconstruction and development commenced in April with a shift in coordinating agencies and sectoral focus. Bilateral agencies were asked to assist in alternative livelihood development to diversify the region’s economic base and to advise on environmental protection, disaster preparedness and risk reduction. Additionally, the launching of the Development Assistance Database is aimed at assisting the Thai authorities in the coordination of international development assistance and also to increase accountability to donors and beneficiaries.

While the choices of the interventions in different stages were strategic, the cost efficiency of some international assistance is questionable. Prior to the tsunami, most international agencies with a presence in Bangkok had a regional mandate; their national development programmes having ended or having been sharply reduced in the late 1990s in response to Thailand’s development performance. While the international tsunami assistance was effective in strengthening national and local capacities in the relief and recovery stage, involvement in the longer-term reconstruction by UN agencies engaged in participatory planning projects at village level may not be the most efficient use of resources as it will be hard to devote the same level of resources to these pilot projects if they were to be implemented on a larger scale. At the same time, the strategic partnerships developed with local NGOs through these pilot projects will be valuable to advocate for change in policy frameworks and practices at provincial and national levels.

#### Core message 2: Pay attention to the closely inter-related concerns of equity, inclusion and downward accountability

International assistance in Thailand prioritised inclusion of vulnerable groups and some international NGOs assisted vulnerable communities to purchase of land for resettlement near their original villages. International actors also lobbied for clemency and inclusion of unregistered workers in the national recovery efforts. At the same time some vulnerable groups’ interests could have been more effectively addressed.

The special needs of women were included in international agencies’ project designs but the mission did not encounter special efforts to strengthen the capacity of, and promote opportunities for, Thai women in official decision-making structures. One UN agency identified increased vulnerability of women and children in sexually risky behaviour to compensate for lost livelihoods.

Although the Development Assistance Database system was intended to increase accountability to beneficiaries, it did not resonate with national authorities due to lack of on-line translation and inclusion of Thai government and private sector programmes. The system is expected to do little to introduce downward accountability practices in Thailand.

While the conflict among Buddhist and Muslim communities intensified in the neighbouring provinces, international agencies did not include conflict considerations in their tsunami work. Agencies could well devote more attention to the process of equitable inclusion of marginal Muslim fisher communities as a means of learning good practices which could then be applied in the recovery and peace building efforts in the three southern provinces.

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The absence of clear documentation and monitoring of private sector donations in Thailand raises key questions that require further study.

1. A clear definition of tsunami recovery funding is required to distinguish between humanitarian assistance and charitable business engagement.
2. As many private sector donations are made in the form of grants and soft loans to restore livelihoods, more attention is needed to setting criteria for eligible candidates and decision making procedures. Without proper monitoring, these funds could favour medium size enterprises, and exclude communities with contested land titles, or worse, promote commercial tourism development at the expense of indigenous communities, thus exacerbating inequalities and tensions.
3. Registration and monitoring of private sector donations to tsunami affected areas would be a means of addressing rumours of corruption.

#### Core message 3: Foster enabling policy conditions and safe contexts

The international tsunami response in Thailand has emphasised inclusive policies for vulnerable and marginalised communities. Media and national NGO networks played a crucial watchdog role and add to the protection of rights of affected marginal communities. However, by setting up partnerships between international and local actors, the international community could do more to strengthen the capacity of community organisations to advocate for basic rights and to implement an advocacy agenda. While the tsunami response did put these issues on the agenda and created a mechanism that could form the basis for accountable information sharing, further efforts are required to improve public transparency and accountability.

### Recommendations

In relation to the core messages:

#### 1 Sustained and respectful engagement with local and national capacities

* There is a need at national level to recognise and value local capacities at individual and community levels, and to adopt more participatory policy and practice frameworks.
* There is a need for transparent planning and monitoring of national and private contributions to the tsunami reconstruction phase, especially in the livelihoods sector.
* Information sharing with beneficiaries needs to be improved to create space for increased participation, ownership and sustainability.
* To enhance local development, international agencies should play a more prominent role in facilitating partnerships between Thai authorities and local NGOs in the reconstruction and development process.

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#### 2 Equity, inclusion and bottom-up accountability

* Housing and resettlement programmes need to acknowledge indigenous land claims and apply culturally appropriate planning solutions that incorporate indigenous life styles.
* International agencies have been targeting vulnerable groups to overcome exclusion and inequality issues, but there needs to be more strategic policy advocacy to incorporate valuable pilot experiences in development frameworks.
* There is an opportunity to integrate conflict and disaster prevention assistance.

Projects to increase participation and reduce inequality in service delivery to poor

Muslim communities could provide valuable models for peace-building in the south.

* There is a need for more gender sensitive programming, especially in the areas of women’s participation in public decision-making. There is a need to make relevant information accessible to women.
* Systematic mechanisms of downward accountability and transparency are not in place. International agencies could assist authorities to develop mechanisms to monitor the reconstruction process and strengthen accountability at the community level.
* The DAD system in its present form does not strengthen downward accountability. It needs to be translated into the Thai language and include government and private sector donations to the tsunami.

#### 3 Fostering an enabling policy framework and safe environment

* International assistance was appropriately geared towards enabling local capacities and empowering beneficiaries. It included context-sensitive communication strategies and sustainable disaster preparedness systems. However, the fostering of inclusive and gender-sensitive governance modalities requires continued attention for a sustained meaningful participation.
* Continued support to human rights NGOs and local NGO networks will be required over the next years to develop and implement an advocacy agenda that has been set by claimholders to address land disputes, child protection, political participation, anti corruption, and transparency, and to promote independent watchdog movements.
* Mutually accountable partnerships between Thai authorities, CBOs and communities need to be built and strengthened to enable meaningful and informed participation in decision-making at all levels.
* Thailand made commendable headway to get disaster awareness and preparedness systems in place at national, district and community level. It is now important to incorporate globally accepted benchmarks on participation and inclusion of vulnerable groups.

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# Annex 6: Indonesia claimholder survey

## Background and process

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The Indonesia claim-holder or beneficiary survey[[24]](#footnote-24) was conceived and designed to seek validation from affected communities of the detailed interviews and discussions held with a cross-section of stakeholders relating to the international tsunami response in the country, paying special attention to the engagement and responsiveness to local and national capacities. In addition, the survey allowed participants to identify other issues and provide both a phased and overall assessment of this response.

The best instrument for such a survey was, therefore, a questionnaire that would elicit both qualitative and quantitative data, to be administered in selected districts within the Aceh and Nias provinces. However, lack of time and funds, coupled with the difficulty of finding an appropriate partner to administer the questionnaires there, resulted in the removal of Nias Island from the process. In Aceh, a similar situation led to the exclusion of Simeulu, leaving only four districts to participate in the survey. Specific areas were selected on the basis of a combination of factors, including stakeholder requests, the need to cover conflict-affected and difficult-to-access areas, and the ability to find, at such short notice, suitable partners to conduct the survey in chosen areas.

In adherence to the principle that ‘insiders’ from the various communities interviewed would be in a much better position to elicit responses on politically and culturally sensitive issues, it was determined that local community-based organisations (CBOs) or NGOs with community roots be enlisted as partners to conduct the survey. Thus, Forum LSM, the largest and most active NGO consortium working in Aceh Province was the obvious and ideal choice for coordinating the entire exercise.

The selection of appropriate questions to be included in the questionnaire was done on the basis of initial discussions with stakeholders and the interviewers themselves. First, key areas were identified and sample questions discussed, which provided the model for the other questions. A number of pre-formed questions were modified or deleted and others added in their stead, as a result of the feedback provided by these groups and the local consultant.

The claim-holder survey consisted of two parts. The first part contained 24 questions of a relatively straightforward factual nature, and included basic information such as the nature of the impact of the tsunami on the respondent, the types of assistance received and demographic details. To facilitate a frank and unfettered response, the identity of the respondents was protected, with individually distinctive features (such as name, house number or national identity card number) not being recorded.

The second part of the questionnaire contained 20 descriptive questions, each of which was structured in the form of a mini-dialogue or ‘conversation’ that would be triggered by the preceding response within that question. Interviewers were trained in this technique, so that they could use the written questions as a guide to eliciting information through a structured dialogue rather than getting stock answers.

## The interview sample

Table A6.1 presents some basic information on the interviewers and the areas selected for interview, and Table A6.2 contains demographic information about the survey respondents.

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## Constraints and limitations

Time and funding constraints, lack of access to certain ‘remote’ areas, the onset of Ramadan during the data collection period, combined with logistical problems of coordination and monitoring were the main difficulties encountered in undertaking the claim-holder survey in Indonesia. These and other contextual constraints identified in the introduction did not permit (a) administering the questionnaire in Simeulue within Aceh Province, as well as on Nias Island, and (b) adequate cross-checking of data collection and entry for accuracy and comprehensiveness.

## Analysis of responses

This section provides a summary analysis of some key findings of the Indonesia claimholder survey.

Question 26 in the survey relates to ‘whether in the first three months you received what you needed (in terms of both goods and services) from the government, local organisations and international organisations.’ While 57 per cent (of the 1,000 respondents) agreed that their needs had been met, and another 9 per cent said they had received food and medicines, 11 per cent, which is a significant proportion, answered that they had received ‘nothing’ (Figure A6.1).

This figure is unique to Indonesia, since in the other countries studied there was hardly any legitimate claim-holder who had not been provided with any assistance in the first three months. Note that this is not an assessment of adequate or appropriate assistance, but, if the response has been made responsibly, it is a claim that nothing at all was received. In other countries, a few families had fallen through the cracks of the system altogether, and others had complaints that they were not provided with sufficient assistance in a timely and equitable manner, but this scale of alleged exclusion is

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| 95 |

**Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities**

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|  | | **Table A6.1: The claim-holder survey in Indonesia** | | |  |  |
| Number of interviewers | | | 30 |
|  | | Number of organisations (NGOs or CBOs) represented | | | 8 |  |
|  | | Period during which interviews were conducted | | | October/November 2005 |
|  | | Number of provinces | | | 1 |  |
|  | | Number of districts | | | 4 |
|  | | Number of sub-districts | | | 36 |
| Number of villages | | | 149 |
|  | | Total number of interviews | | | 1,000 |
|  | | Number of interviews by district  Banda Aceh | | | 246 |
|  | | Aceh Jaya | | | 257 |  |
|  | | Aceh Besar | | | 247 |  |
|  | | Pidi | | | 250 |  |
|  | | **Table A6.2: Key demographic details of survey respondents in Indonesia** | | | |  |
| Number of respondents | 1,000 | | |
|  | | Gender disaggregation of respondents | Male 49.9%, female 45.1%, undisclosed 5.0% | | |  |
|  | | Religion of respondents | Muslim 99.9%, undisclosed 0.1% | | |
|  | | First language of respondents | Bahasa Aceh 95.0%, Bahasa Indonesia 4.3%, Bahasa Nias 0.1%, Baiko 0.2%, undisclosed 0.4% | | |  |
|  | | Educational attainment of respondents | Islamic school 27.1%, diploma 26.5%, NAD 23.5%, postgraduate 6.2%, boarding school 1.5%, unknown 15.2% | | |
|  | | Income level of respondents (self-categorisation) | Poorest 12.6%, middle poor 30.4%, upwardly mobile poor 37.9%, middle class 14.6%, rich 2.3%, unknown 2.2% | | |  |
| **Figure A6.1: Assistance received in the first three months after the tsunami**  **(Question 26)** | | |
| **Yes, received food and medicine – 9%**  **Nothing – 11%**  **Yes, it did meet my needs, no they didn’t vary – 11%**  **Yes, it did meet my needs,**  **Yes, it was different,**  **I don’t know – 5%**  **Other – 18%**  **we got enough – 46%** | | |

unprecedented. This response is, however, reinforced by the field visit to Nias Island (which was not surveyed), where the ‘more remote’ areas, badly affected by the March earthquake, had also received little or no assistance.

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| **Figure A6.2: Experience of consultation about assistance required (Question 27)** |
| **Yes – 15%**  **Never/no – 57%**  **Yes, they came and asked**  **but nothing given – 4%**  **Yes, not sure who they are – 5%**  **Other – 19%** |

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Question 27 focuses on ‘when, if at all, were you asked what you needed, and by whom?’ and whether respondents felt that there were tangible results from these discussions. Judging from the claim-holder responses, the consultative process appears to have been less than satisfactory, with 57 per cent claiming that they had never been consulted about their needs (Figure A6.2). Only 20 per cent reported being consulted, while another 4 per cent said that the discussion had led nowhere. Since this survey was conducted in the tenth month after the tsunami, such an absence of consultation is serious indeed.

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| **Figure A6.3: Preference for cash instead of food and other relief items (Question 28)** |
| **We like cash directly,**  **Easier**  **for us – 69%**  **I don’t know – 12%**  **Easier because we can**  **start a new job – 4%**  **We like cash directly, no people**  **don’t feel differently – 5%**  **Other – 10%** |

Question 28 asks whether, in the first three months, cash transfers would have been preferable to the supply of food and other relief items provided. An overwhelming 90 per cent felt that cash in lieu of food and other relief items would be better (Figure A6.3). Had the participatory decision-making process been working better, in deference to popular consensus, cash grants could have been instituted on a much larger scale, at least in areas with significant active local markets. As has been pointed out in the literature, cash grants have the advantage of minimising administrative and overhead costs of donors, in addition to supporting the local economy.

**Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities**

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| **Figure A6.4: Experience of community-level discussions with local government and other agencies (Question 29)** |
| **Other – 10%**  **No, they never**  **discussed it – 62%**  **Yes, we had discussions – 3%**  **Yes, sometimes we**  **have meetings – 3%**  **Yes – 22%** |

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Question 29 refers to collective community-level discussions with local government, Achenese NGOs, INGOs and others, and asks whether there was any visible coordination among these agencies. The response is again mainly negative, with 62 per cent saying that they had never participated or been informed of such discussions, and 28 per cent aware of some meetings and/or discussions (Figure A6.4). The second part of the question relating to duplication and waste was not addressed directly by the respondents.

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| **Figure A6.5: Perceptions of changes in the roles of women since the tsunami (Question 32)** |
| **Other – 13%**  **Yes, there are many**  **changes – 15%**  **Yes, there are**  **good changes – 20%**  **Yes changes, both**  **No change – 43%**    **good and bad – 9%** |

Question 32 asks respondents whether women in the community have changed as a result of the tsunami response, and whether these changes are considered to be good or bad. In the first instance, there is symmetry between those who agree that there has been change, and those who don’t (44 and 43 per cent, respectively). Of those who perceive changes, 20 per cent identify them as good, while 9 per cent state that both good and bad changes have taken place (Figure A6.5). In the context of the less than positive scenario portrayed in the pervious questions, the positive change in the role and function of women in a traditional society is clearly a positive outcome of the tsunami response, which needs to be protected and nurtured in the post-tsunami return to ‘normality’, since experience elsewhere has been that some of these fragile gains may be rolled back after the most serious consequences of the natural disaster (or conflict) have been addressed.

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| **Figure A6.6: Perceptions of the fairness of distribution of goods and services**  **(Question 39)** |
| **Not fair, friends of**  **coordinator get more – 6%**  **Other – 10%**  **Unfair – 15%**  **Fair – 75%** |

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Question 39 considers whether everyone has benefited equally from the tsunami assistance, and whether the distribution of goods and the provision of services were implemented fairly and equitably. While 75 per cent of the responses indicated that the benefits had been administered fairly, a significant proportion (21 per cent) felt that the distribution was unfair. Of this group, 6 per cent went as far as to allege favouritism on the part of coordinators (those responsible for the delivery of goods), which is a corruption issue that needs to be addressed by all stakeholders as a matter of high priority. The implication from this response is, of course, the need for greater accountability and transparency at all levels, which includes the right to timely, accurate and user-friendly information.

## Conclusions

This claim-holder survey remains an important benchmark in the analysis of the tsunami response since it provides a systematic and rigorous basis for validating more ad hoc assessments. The number of interviews (1,000) and their distribution in three urban and semi-urban districts and one conflict-affected and less accessible district makes this survey crucial to future assessments as well. A further strength of this survey is that it was conducted through partnership with organisations with roots and continuing engagement in the areas surveyed, and that the survey questions and processes were streamlined in consultation with these partners and their representatives who conducted the interviews. This utilisation of ‘insiders’ to conduct the interviews was identified by the communities as a key element in their ability to be open and frank in their responses. It should be noted that this finding reinforces the comments made by many of those interviewed during the field visits, even in areas where the survey was not conducted.

# Annex 7: Sri Lanka claimholder survey – summary

## Background and process

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The Sri Lanka claim-holder survey[[25]](#footnote-25) was based on a questionnaire containing both qualitative and quantitative data, administered in nine key districts within the worstaffected southern and northeastern provinces. However, the deteriorating security situation, monsoon conditions and problems relating to access, combined with the peculiar dynamic created by the imminent presidential election, resulted in the exclusion from the process of the Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu districts in the north. In addition, the questionnaires from Jaffna district were not received in time for inclusion in this report. Specific areas within the districts were selected on the basis of a combination of factors, including stakeholder requests, the need to cover conflict-affected and difficult-to-access areas, and the ability to find, at short notice, suitable partners to conduct the survey in these areas. In this respect, common ground was found in the form of shared principles between the surveys in Indonesia and Sri Lanka.

In adherence to the principle that people from the various communities interviewed would be in a much better position to elicit responses on politically and culturally sensitive issues, it was determined that local community-based organisations (CBOs) or NGOs with community roots be enlisted as partners to conduct the survey. The selection of partner organisations to participate in administering this survey was done with the assistance of UNDP, supplementing its district-level presence with the support of member organisations of the TEC steering committee.

In order to ensure a foundation for comparison across the two countries, the same basic questions used in Aceh were used in the Sri Lanka claim-holder survey, subject to appropriate modification necessitated by contextual and cultural specifics. The broad types of questions to be included in the questionnaire were discussed with stakeholders and communities during field visits to affected areas. Training in administering the questionnaire was conducted by the TEC team, and the local consultant undertook close monitoring of the entire process.

The claim-holder survey was in three parts. The first part contained 25 questions on basic issues such as the impact of the tsunami on the respondent, the types of assistance received and demographic details. The second part of the questionnaire contained 20 descriptive questions, each of which was structured in the form of a mini-dialogue or ‘conversation’ that would be triggered by the preceding response within that question. The third part of the questionnaire consisted of a set of 16 assessments for respondents to make by choosing the most appropriate number from 1 (‘good’) to 5 (‘bad’).

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The local consultant examined 10 per cent of the completed questionnaires for accuracy, consistency and omissions. If there were recurrent problems the interviewer concerned was advised and the problems remedied. In the southern province some of the interviewers were met in the field and assisted with collecting information. Tabulation of data was done from the original languages, Sinhala and Tamil, using the specialised social-science software package for data analysis, SPSS, under the supervision of the team leader. The dataset is now complete, with the exception of the questionnaires from the Jaffna district, which had not been received by 20 January 2005, due to the prevailing security concerns.

## The interview sample

Table A7.1 presents some basic information on the interviewers and the areas selected for interview, and Table A7.2 contains demographic information about the survey respondents.

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|  | **Table A7.1: The claim-holder survey in Sri Lanka** | |  |  | | |
| Number of interviewers | | 34 |
|  | Number of organisations (NGOs or CBOs) represented | | 13 |  | | |
|  | Period during which interviews were conducted | | November/December 2005 |
|  | Number of provinces | | 2 |  | | |
|  | Number of districts | | 6[[26]](#footnote-26) |
|  | Number of sub-districts (Divisional Secretary Divisions) | | 28 |
| Number of villages | | 68 |
|  | Total number of interviews | | 1,055 |
|  | Number of interviews by district  Hambantota | | 174 |
|  | Galle | | 126 |  | | |
|  | Matara | | 142 |  | | |
|  | Ampara | | 206 |  | | |
|  | Batticaloa | | 213 |  | | |
|  | Trincomalee | | 194 |  | | |
|  | **Table A7.2: Key demographic details of survey respondents in Sri Lanka** | | | |  |
| Number of respondents | 1,055 | | |
|  | Gender disaggregation of respondents | Male 49.9%, female 50.8% | | |  |
|  | Religion of respondents | Buddhists 34.7%, Muslims 25.4%, Hindu 23.1%, Christian 13.0%, undisclosed 0.1% | | |
|  | Educational attainment of respondents | Illiterate (8.9%), primary (24.3%), GCE Ordinary Level (38.5%), GCE Advanced Level (21.6%), university and equivalent (4.1%), unspecified 2.6% | | |  |
|  | Income level of respondents (self-categorisation) | Poorest (13.8%), middle poor (26.1%), upwardly mobile poor (22.8%), middle class (31.8%), rich (3.3%), unspecified 2.2% | | |

## Findings

The following is a presentation of the data in the simplest format and without explanation. The full report, with explanations and commentary by Arjuna Parakrama will be made available through TEC along with the full country reports.

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### 1. General response

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|  |
| **Gendered assessment of the tsunami response, for different phases and overall** |
| **Male**  **60**  **%**  **50**  **40**  **30**  **20**  **10**  **0**  **Female**  **Good**  **Somewhat satisfied**  **sfied**  **Neither satisfied nor dissati**  **Somewhat dissatisfied**  **Bad**  **Female**  **Male**  **Female**  **Male**  **Female**  **Male**      **BSQ1 BSQ2 BSQ3 BSQ16** |

BSQ1: How well were your needs provided in the first week after the tsunami?

BSQ2: How well were your needs provided in the first three months after the tsunami?

BSQ3: How well were your needs provided in the next five months after that?

BSQ16: In general, how do you rate the international assistance to the tsunami?

### 2. Access to support

|  |
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| **Accessibility and responsiveness of government officials, international and local agencies, community leaders, and dependability of agencies working in village** |
| **35**  **%**  **30**  **25**  **20**  **15**  **10**  **5**  **0**  **BSQ12**  **BSQ7**  **BSQ6**  **BSQ5**  **BSQ4**  **Good**  **Somewhat satisfied**  **atisfied nor dissatisfied**  **Neither s**  **t dissatisfied**  **Somewha**  **Bad** |

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The above graph represents responses to the questions:

BSQ 4: How accessible and responsive were government officials to your concerns?

BSQ 5: How accessible and responsive were international agencies to your concerns?

BSQ 6: How accessible and responsive were local agencies to your concerns?

BSQ 7: How accessible and responsive were community leaders to your concerns?

BSQ 12: How reliable/dependable were the agencies that worked in your village?

### 3. Access to justice

The following table presents the main claim-holder responses to the question ‘If there is an injustice, how can you remedy it?’ The second column represents the options provided. The responses have been disaggregated by province. This means that 15.59 per cent of the Southern Province respondents and 5.07 per cent of those from the north-east felt that remedy for injustice should be sought through the tsunami committees.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | |
|  |  | **Southern (%)** | **North & east (%)** | **Overall (%)** |  |
| Question 38 | Through tsunami committees | 15.18 | 5.38 | 9.49 |
|  | Inform HR organisations | 2.17 | 10.94 | 7.27 |  |
|  |  | Inform authorities | 41.93 | 36.63 | 38.85 |  |
|  |  | Organise protest | 26.75 | 24.31 | 25.33 |  |
|  |  | Accept anything without questioning | 5.06 | 8.85 | 7.27 |
|  | Put up with injustice in relief distribution | 18.80 | 5.21 | 10.90 |  |

Note: Respondents were permitted more than one choice.

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### 4. Using skills and capacities

|  |
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| **Use of local skills and abilities, changes in capacity, relating to vulnerable groups and nature of community consultations**  **(mean values, 1 = good and 5 = bad)** |
| |  | | --- | |  | |  | |  | |  |   **Bad 5**  **4**  **Mean 3**  **2**  **Good 1**  **BSQ10 BSQ11 BSQ14 BSQ15** |

The graph above shows responses to the following questions:

BSQ 10: How well did the tsunami response use your skills and abilities?

BSQ 11: How would you assess the changes in capacities that took place as a result?

BSQ 14: How well did the tsunami response take into account women, children and most vulnerable groups?

BSQ 15: How useful do you think were the consultations held at the community level regarding providing you with goods and services, including housing?

### 5. Appropriateness of the response

|  |
| --- |
| **Appropriateness of regulations, longer-term impact of tsunami assistance and suitability of tsunami response at village level** |
| **35**  **40**  **%**  **30**  **25**  **20**  **15**  **10**  **5**  **0**  **BSQ9**  **BSQ13**  **BSQ8**  **Good**  **Somewhat satisfied**  **Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied**  **Somewhat dissatisfied**  **Bad** |

The graph on the previous page represents responses to the following questions:

BSQ 8: How appropriate were the rules/decisions that affected you after the tsunami?

BSQ 9: What is your view of the longer-term impact of the tsunami assistance on you?

BSQ 13: How suitable was the response to the tsunami as it affected your village?

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### 6. Ideas for improving the response

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| **What aspects of the international and national tsunami response would you like to see changed?** |
| **5**  **4**  **3**  **2**  **1**  **Good**  **Mean**  **Bad**  **BSQ10**  **Q15**  **Q11**  **S**  **B**  **4**  **1**  **BSQ**  **BS**  **30**  **%**  **25**  **20**  **15**  **10**  **5**  **0**  **Continue cash**  **Distribute aid**  **Assign INGO**  **More livelihood**  **Can’t say**  **Increase people’s**  **assistance equally to all per area programmes participation** |

### 7. Spread of benefits

|  |
| --- |
| **Has everyone in your community benifited equally from tsunami assistance?** |
| **5**  **4**  **3**  **2**  **1**  **Good**  **Mean**  **Bad**  **BSQ10**  **BSQ15**  **BSQ14**  **BSQ11**  **45**  **%**  **40**  **35**  **30**  **25**  **20**  **15**  **10**  **5**  **0**  **Equal**  **assistance**  **Favouritism**  **Assistance not**  **equal**  **Non-victims**  **received**  **Fraud**  **Overall**  **Southern**  **North and east** |

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### 8. Assessment of aid responses

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| --- |
| **Question 26 (multiple answers)** |
| **7.32**  **13.57**  **15.43**  **17.38**  **5.08**  **20.80**  **25**  **%**  **20**  **15**  **3**  **4**  **5**  **6**  **7**  **8**  **9**  **10**  **12**  **13**  **1**  **2**  **14**  **10**  **5**  **0**  **14.65**  **5**  **.57**  **4.49**  **11.82**  **15.72**  **6.35**  **16.21** |

26. Please describe whether in the first three months after the tsunami you received what you needed (in terms of both goods and services) from the government, local organisations and international organisations. What main differences do you see in the approaches of these organisations?

1. = Food items received were inadequate
2. = Received too many unnecessary goods
3. = Did not receive anything from the government at all
4. = Local organisations provided, but we not did receive anything
5. = Received assistance from INGOs
6. = Received assistance from villagers, relatives and other people
7. = NGOs provided food items and other goods
8. = No assistance from government in first three months
9. = Assistance received from foreigners and tourists
10. = Immediate response and need fulfilment by local and overseas NGOs was satisfactory
11. = NGOs provided assistance in accordance with our requirements
12. = Problems arose due to the slowness of the government
13. = The government provided us with our requirements

### 9. Consultation

**Question 27 (multiple answers)**

**1**

**32.1**

**6**

**15.9**

**7.23**

**6.94**

**17.05**

**6**

**15.2**

**35**

**%**

**30**

**25**

**6**

**7**

**17**

**2**

**1**

**3**

**4**

**5**

**20**

**15**

**10**

**5**

**0**

**23.98**

**9.12**

106

27. When, if at all, were you asked what you needed, and by whom? How and where did these discussions take place? Do you feel that your ideas were listened to, and by whom?

What were the results, if any, of the ideas you expressed?

1. = No organisation or person enquired about it
2. = From the day of the disaster onwards we have been asked about our requirements
3. = Several NGO workers have asked for our ideas
4. = Our opinions were listened to only up to a certain level
5. = On the basis of the aid and cooperation received we can say that our opinions havehad results
6. = The government enquired
7. = There is still no response to our opinions

17 = NGOs collected data and distributed aid based on this

### 10. Aid preferences

28. In the first three months, instead of food and other items, if you had been given cash by NGOs, would it have been easier or more difficult for you and your family? Now, what would be the best way to receive assistance? Are there others in your area who may feel differently? Explain.

1. = Food and other items are much more important than money
2. = Cash is much more important
3. = The best way to assist is to find badly affected families and to offer them
4. = If we have money we can buy what we require
5. = Receiving expired food items and non-preferred food items is a problem
6. = Receiving both cash and food items is the best

8 = Now our requirement is goods and services to build our daily lives

**Question 28 (multiple answers)**

**52.77**

**12.25**

**11.66**

**%**

**60**

**50**

**2**

**1**

**3**

**4**

**5**

**6**

**8**

**40**

**30**

**20**

**10**

**0**

**1**

**1.36**

**9.49**

**28.66**

**5.63**

|  |
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### 11. Quality of discussions

**Question 29 (multiple answers)**

**8.84**

**8.24**

**4.07**

**18.17**

**4.87**

**8.14**

**14.80**

**10.23**

**6**

**.26**

**20**

**%**

**18**

**16**

**13**

**12**

**11**

**8**

**7**

**4**

**3**

**1**

**9**

**5**

**15**

**16**

**26**

**22**

**14**

**12**

**10**

**8**

**6**

**4**

**2**

**0**

**5.16**

**7.25**

**11.12**

**4.97**

**4.97**

29. In your village or camp, did local NGOs, INGOs, government officers and others collectively discuss with all of you what you needed most? How often did this happen, and what form did it take? Did the different organisations and individuals working in your area coordinate well, or did you feel any sense of confusion or duplication? Please explain with specific examples.

1 = During the first few days no one discussed it

1. = They did discuss
2. = Coordination was good
3. = Discussed once a month at the camp
4. = Even though they discussed they were unsuccessful
5. = Coordination was weak
6. = I do not know whether they discussed or not
7. = No one discussed
8. = They discussed and gathered information but nothing worked out
9. = Government and NGOs discussed individually
10. = NGOs discussed
11. = Discussions took place about once or twice a week

22 = Assistance was given after discussions

26 = NGOs discussed more than the government

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### 12. Impact on individuals

**Question 30 (multiple answers)**

**%**

**60**

**50**

**6**

**8**

**11**

**19**

**2**

**1**

**4**

**5**

**40**

**30**

**20**

**10**

**0**

**51.59**

**4.08**

**6.77**

**7.37**

**6.87**

**11.45**

**5.78**

**5.38**

30. In what ways, if at all, have you and your family changed as a result of the tsunami assistance? Are these changes good or bad? Why have these changes taken place? Are these changes typical for your community?

1. = Nothing changed
2. = There was no big change in the family
3. = There is anger shown against each other
4. = (We) became dependents
5. = There were some changes in the family

8 = Became stronger with aid

11 = Aid is not delivered properly

19 = We live with mental stress

### 13. Community leaders

31. In what ways, if at all, have your community leaders changed as a result of the tsunami assistance? Are these changes good or bad? Why have these changes taken place? Do you think these changes will be permanent? Should they be?

**Question 31 (multiple answers)**

**7.48**

**%**

**25**

**20**

**20**

**4**

**1**

**2**

**3**

**5**

**6**

**7**

**10**

**11**

**12**

**15**

**15**

**10**

**5**

**0**

**9.37**

**21.34**

**5.98**

**9.87**

**5.18**

**4.49**

**18.5**

**4**

**6.68**

**8.67**

**4.19**

**7.88**

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1. = Respect toward community leaders is gradually decreasing
2. = They failed to distribute assistance properly
3. = Community leaders cheated the people and got the aid
4. = Do not know
5. = Nothing to say about it
6. = They earned good respect
7. = Community leaders helped in many ways
8. = Community leaders have not changed
9. = Earlier they helped us, but no more
10. = Some community leaders showed negative changes

15 = The changes are not good

20 = Public received adequate level of support from community leaders

### 14. Changes in the community

32. In what ways, if at all, have the women in your community changed as a result of the tsunami assistance? Are these changes good or bad? Why have these changes taken place?

Do you think these changes will be permanent? Should they be?

1. = No differences were seen there
2. = Women have begun income-generation activities
3. = Women try to live on donations
4. = Women move away from their families
5. = Women’s freedom has been reduced
6. = Women lost their self-respect
7. = Women are under mental pressure

**Question 32 (multiple answers)**

**%**

**40**

**35**

**30**

**25**

**20**

**15**

**10**

**5**

**0**

**1**

**8**

**2**

**3**

**5**

**6**

**7**

**34.96**

**19.36**

**11.32**

**4.17**

**6.55**

**4.17**

**4.97**

### 15. Government officers

33. In what ways, if at all, have government and NGO officers changed as a result of the tsunami assistance? Are these changes good or bad? Why have these changes taken place?

|  |
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Do you think these changes will be permanent? Should they be?

1. = No changes
2. = Could not even meet government officers as they are so busy
3. = There are problems with NGO officers

**Question 33 (multiple answers)**

**14.77**

**22.95**

**4.89**

**6.59**

**11.78**

**7.68**

**22.65**

**5.19**

**4.59**

**8.88**

**16.57**

**4.89**

**25**

**%**

**20**

**15**

**4**

**1**

**2**

**3**

**21**

**5**

**8**

**11**

**12**

**14**

**15**

**17**

**10**

**5**

**0**

1. = Government officers have not changed
2. = Aid was distributed unfairly

8 = Do not know

1. = Changes in the NGO officers were good
2. = There are good and bad changes in government officers
3. = Changes in government officers were bad
4. = Every officer worked well only during the first few months

17 = Every officer worked well

21 = NGO officers show both good and bad changes

### 16. Role of NGOs

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| 111 |

34. In what ways, if at all, have government and NGOs as institutions and structures (not as individuals or in special situations) changed as a result of the tsunami assistance? Are these changes good or bad? Why have these changes taken place? Do you think these changes will be permanent? Should they be?

1. = Organisations tend to deliver assistance
2. = Both governmental and NGO organisations changed
3. = They have come down to the village level
4. = Changes in these organisations are for the better
5. = Changes in the government were no good

7 = They are too concerned about the development of their own organisations

9 = Organisations changed due to the assistance

1. = There were no changes
2. = I do not know

21 = NGOs really worked hard

|  |
| --- |
| **Question 34 (multiple answers)** |
| |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | **1** | **8.07** |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  | |  | |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  | |  | |  |  |  | **13.87** |  |  |  |  | | **14.71** | |  | |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | **10.08** | |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | | **5.99** |  |  |  |  | **6** | **.20** |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  | **5.04** | **4** | **.52** | **5.57** |  |  |  |  |  | **4.73** | |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |   **% 20**  **18**  **16**  **14**  **12**  **10**  **8**  **6**  **4**  **2**  **0**  **1 2 3 4 5 7 9 18 19 21** |

### 17. Changes in organisations

37. Are there important differences in the ways of working of organisations that were in your area before the tsunami to those that came only after the tsunami? What, if any, are these differences? There are also differences in the ways in which agencies work to provide tsunami assistance. In your view, which are the best ways of working, and why?

1. = No changes
2. = There were no organisations before the tsunami
3. = Organisations which were there before the tsunami worked for their financial benefit
4. = New organisations (after tsunami) provided free services
5. = Some organisations active before the tsunami became inactive after the tsunami
6. = Pre-tsunami organisations helped us well
7. = Post-tsunami organisations distributed aid even among unaffected families
8. = Pre-tsunami organisations are inactive
9. = There are some changes
10. = The best approach is to discuss with the public and identify their needs

14 = These organisations should work with village-based organisations

1. = Tsunami Operation Committees should be formed in every village to guide all work
2. = I do not know

23 = Post-tsunami organisations worked successfully

|  |
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| 112 |

28 = The organising skills of both types of organisations need to be improved

**Question 37 (multiple answers)**

**30**

**%**

**25**

**20**

**6**

**18**

**14**

**11**

**10**

**9**

**8**

**7**

**4**

**3**

**2**

**1**

**19**

**23**

**28**

**15**

**10**

**5**

**0**

**8.09**

**4.45**

**9.91**

**6.17**

**14.86**

**11.22**

**9.81**

**9.81**

**24.17**

**7.28**

**5.66**

**8.59**

**2**

**0.6**

**1**

**4.65**

**10.21**

### 18. Equality of benefits

39. Has everyone in your community benefited from the tsunami assistance equally? If not, describe who has received more, and who has received less. Are there any people who have been left out altogether? If so, why?

3 = Families with women heads received very little assistance

1. = People who have the confidence to speak out got more assistance
2. = Poor people are highly affected

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| 113 |

1. = People still looking for assistance are high in number

|  |
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| **Question 39 (multiple answers)** |
| |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | **35.48** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  | **32.45** |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  | **7.72** |  |  | **7.92** | **4.59** | **5.96** |  | |  |  | **4.20** |  |  |  |  | **4.11** |   **% 40**  **35**  **30**  **25**  **20**  **15**  **10**  **5**  **0**  **Equal Favouritism 3 Assistance Non-victims 19 20 21 assistance equal received** |

**19. Who was worst affected?**

**Question 40 (multiple answers)**

**%**

**45**

**40**

**35**

**30**

**25**

**20**

**15**

**10**

**5**

**0**

**5**

**31**

**26**

**22**

**19**

**6**

**4**

**3**

**1**

**40.75**

**12.81**

**7.80**

**10.60**

**4.14**

**14.74**

**5**

**17.0**

**13.0**

**1**

**5.78**

40. In your view, which types or categories of people have been the worst affected by the tsunami? Why? Which categories and types of people have been affected least by the tsunami?

1 = People in the coastal areas are highly affected

1. = Women are highly affected
2. = Children are highly affected
3. = People away from the coastal area are less affected
4. = Old people are highly affected

19 = The tsunami affected all people in the region equally

22 = Muslims are highly affected

26 = Tamils are highly affected

31 = Sinhalese are less affected than other communities

### 20. Accountability

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| 114 |

43. Who are the agencies working on tsunami relief, etc accountable to? Who should they be accountable to? How should this accountability be practised on the ground? What is the best process of accountability, in your view?

1. = The government should be responsible to the public
2. = Community leaders should be responsible to villagers
3. = Be responsible to people in the area
4. = Government should be responsible to the international sector
5. = Cannot say
6. = Every organisation should be responsible to the government
7. = Agencies should be responsible to their head offices
8. = Do not know

13 = Responsibility can be achieved by working with a proper plan based on correct research findings

17 = Even NGOs are not responsible

|  |
| --- |
| **Question 43 (multiple answers)** |
| **%**  **30**  **25**  **20**  **15**  **10**  **5**  **0**  **1**  **2**  **3**  **4**  **5**  **8**  **9**  **13**  **17**  **7**  **10.31**  **6.70**  **6.91**  **20.52**  **6.70**  **5.26**  **17.11**  **10.62**  **24.64**  **8.35** |

**Question 44 (multiple answers)**

**%**

**30**

**25**

**20**

**15**

**10**

**5**

**0**

**2**

**1**

**3**

**4**

**5**

**13**

**17**

**7**

**8**

**9**

**24.75**

**14.49**

**0**

**0.7**

**1**

**6.**

**02**

**13.38**

**4.35**

**4.24**

**46**

**5.**

**7.47**

**5.80**

**. Issues for the people**

**21**

. What are the main issues (doubts, non-clarity, difficulty), if any, that you have with the

44

tsunami response, in terms of government policy and NGO practice? How can you

contribute to changing these issues? Are there any processes in place to do this? What is

the best process to follow to do this?

= No doubts

1

= Not pleased about government performance

2

= Should work for everybody according to a proper policy and with responsibility

3

= Everyone should get together and exert pressure

4

= Unfair distribution of tsunami aid

5

7

= It is better if political involvements were not there

8

= Proper awareness-raising is needed

9

= Even though the objectives of NGOs are not clear, they served the society well

= Much interference can been seen from the GS [Grama Niladhari

]

13

= Government should intervene responsibly and actively

17

### 22. Feedback on the questionnaire

45. Please identify any other issues or concerns that you would like to describe. Please also make any comments you wish on this questionnaire.

1. = This information has been gathered many times

|  |
| --- |
| 115 |

1. = Answers for the questionnaire will soon be forgotten
2. = We need only relief assistance, nothing else
3. = Nothing to say
4. = Results of this questionnaire should be shared with the public
5. = If this survey took place earlier it would have been better
6. = Government should be more active
7. = This questionnaire is very good as it covers many aspects
8. = It is better to start counselling services

|  |
| --- |
| 116 |

1. = If we are rehabilitated, we can stand on our own feet
2. = It is important to obtain public opinion

16 = It is better to force the government to act on this sort of information

31 = Problems are very complex

**Question 45 (multiple answers)**

**%**

**30**

**25**

**20**

**15**

**10**

**5**

**0**

**4**

**3**

**2**

**1**

**6**

**10**

**11**

**13**

**14**

**16**

**31**

**7**

**9**

**7.07**

**4.24**

**22.32**

**6.77**

**13.13**

**5.56**

**27.27**

**4.04**

**7.78**

**4.95**

**5.45**

**4.04**

**5**

**4.8**

|  |
| --- |
| 117 |

# Annex 8: Financial statement

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Expenses** | **US$** |
| National consultant fees | 5,319 |
| International consultant fees | 153,260 |
| Beneficiary survey | 12,814 |
| Travel | 69,305 |
| DSA\*/terminal allowances | 54,372 |
| Admin, communications etc | 3,477 |
| Management consultancy | 62,400 |
| Administration (8% UNOPS)  (\* daily subsistence allowance) | 31,725 |
| **Total**  **Donors**  Action Aid  BMZ (Germany)  Cordaid  MFA (France)  NORAD  Sida  UNDP  UNICEF  UNOCHA USAID  **Total** | **US$392,672**  **US$**  4,500  48,780  24,444  15,384  101,460  8,000  100,000  50,000  14,000  30,000  **US$396,568** |

This first ever multi-location, multi-country joint evaluation of the impact of an international humanitarian response on local capacities – in this case in tsunami-affected countries – found that most lives are saved and the initial response made by the affected communities and their neighbours themselves. When the international community – UN agencies and INGOs – joined these efforts and facilitated local and national efforts at recovery, the impact was heartening. When the international community bypassed or appropriated local and national response, the impact was almost always cost, effort and time ineffective.

This evaluation also found that recovery is complex – early engagement with local actors in the relief efforts is essential for success in recovery and reconstruction efforts. In addition, when the international community engaged with local capacities (actors, institutions and markets), social inequalities and exclusions were better addressed. When local capacities were ignored, social inclusion of the most needy remained an often unsuccessful effort.

Recovery can take place in a context of war, conflict, economic crisis and/or social tension. In all contexts, international assistance is productive when it is better prepared to identify and work with local and national capacities well before the crisis. The tsunami evaluation found that when international agencies are able to resist the pressure to spend quickly and facilitate local efforts for meaningful recovery, achievements of the assistance becomes sustainable. The evaluation concludes that such preparedness and an enabling international environment makes engaging with local capacities easier and more promising for international agencies.

**Funded by**



9

7

8

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8

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2

5

ISBN 0-85003-812-X

The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) is a multi-agency learning and accountability initiative in the humanitarian sector. It was established in February 2005 in the wake of the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunamis of 26 December 2004.

This evaluation of the impact of the tsunami response on local and national capacities is one of a series of five thematic evaluations undertaken by the TEC in 2005/06.

This evaluation was managed by the Strategic and Thematic Evaluation Group in UNDP, New York, and by the All India Disaster Mitigation

Institute (AIDMI). It was guided by a Steering

Committee consisting of representatives from

ActionAid International, AIDMI, CordAid,

UNDP and UNICEF. Funding was provided by

ActionAid International, BMZ (Germany),

CordAid, MFA France, NORAD (Norway), Sida

(Sweden), UNDP, UNICEF, OCHA and USAID (United States).

1. There are serious problems of definition in this table and it should only be taken as a rough guide. 2 In addition, there were meetings with headquarters staff of UN agencies and also with members of the steering committee. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. This includes some community representatives in the case of Sri Lanka. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. In the case of Indonesia, the desk review became available only after the visit. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Aceh is fifth in terms of income poverty out of Indonesia’s 33 provinces, with 29.8 per cent of the population living below the national poverty line in 2002 (Indonesia Bureau of Statistics, 2004). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. See ‘Gender Based Violence in the Maldives’ – study conducted by the Ministry of Gender, Family Development and Social Security supported by UNFPA and WHO, Sept 2004. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Compiled by John Cosgrave of the TEC Secretariat. For Indonesia, data include the earthquake of 28

   March 2005, for which the figure of 626 dead is too low. For instance, Indonesia Relief News of 21

   April 2005, places the death toll at 839 with many still unaccounted for. Sources for this table include USAID (2005), ‘Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunamis: Fact Sheet # 38’ (6 May); and BRR & World Bank (2005) ‘Rebuilding a Better Aceh and Nias: Stocktaking of the Reconstruction Effort’ (October). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. 226,560 total loss. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Official current Government figures are 12,500 displaced and 82 dead. The figure under displaced in the table represents the immediate post-tsunami context. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. 1,768,423 total (India highest). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Average for entire country. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. A number of useful tools exist to support this process, notably Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment and the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Figures for numbers dead and missing are taken from Guha-Sapir and Van Panhuis (2005). [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. The estimated figures for amount of damage are all based on the preliminary needs assessment published by the World Bank, ADB and UNDP. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. The other themes are: coordination (including civil-military issues), impact assessment, needs assessment, linking relief, rehabilitation and development, and donor response, including an assessment of the role of the media. For further details see www.alnap.org/tec. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Including positive and negative policy spin-offs, such as environmental management, land-use planning, and conflict transformation. For example, In Sri Lanka, the tsunami led to a bipartisan process of taking stock of the current state of disaster-risk management in the country and identifying directions for the future. This process itself is a positive spin-off that could be extended to other issues. 19 Research has shown that significantly more women than men died as a result of the tsunami, which has major implications for gender relations in the reconstruction phase. Throughout the evaluation, disaggregated data on the capacities of women and men should be used, as an understanding of the gender imbalance in the death toll is a major factor to be considered in preparedness plans and recovery programmes, as well as in understanding the capacities of affected populations. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Membership of the ESC is open to other agencies/organisations who wish to be included. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Scheduled for 7 and 8 September, in Geneva. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. See ALNAP Proforma (ALNAP, www.alnap.org). [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Scheduling of fieldwork in Indonesia and the Maldives will need to take account of Ramadan, during October. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. For example, in Sri Lanka the National Disaster Management Centre (NDMC), set up by an earlier

    UNDP capacity-building project, was completely sidelined by more powerful institutions such as the Presidential Secretariat, partly because the NDMC lacked the capacity to match the scale of the disaster but largely for political reasons. In the end, the NDMC, which should be a stable institution looking at all aspects of disaster-risk management in the country, has emerged as a highly disempowered institution. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Some stakeholders indicated that relief items remained in warehouses on a number of occasions rather than being immediately distributed. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. UNDP, for example, is channeling funds for shelter and livelihood projects through Island

    Development Committees. Women Development Committees are going to be involved in implementing UNDP livelihood projects for women. Yet not infrequently it is again the island chiefs who dominate these committees. Some island chiefs even seem to be members of Women Development Committees, and in some instances the committee is chaired by the wife of the island chief or dominated by other women from the local elite. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. UNDP’s Atoll Development and Sustainable Livelihood Programme is one well suited framework for this (Maconick 2005 p 4). [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. ‘Beneficiary survey’ is the usual term for such an exercise in soliciting information and feedback from affected communities on the delivery of goods and services by humanitarian agencies in the aftermath of a natural disaster such as the tsunami. However, the term ‘beneficiary’ remains a vestige of the nowunacceptable notion of people as passive recipients of charity. Particularly in an assessment of the engagement with local and national capacities, such nomenclature has proven to be an obstacle. It has therefore been replaced by the term ‘claim-holder’ in this TEC evaluation, reflecting a human-rights-based approach (HRBA) and positing an active, principled partnership in the relief/recovery/rehabilitation process. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Though ‘beneficiary survey’ is the usual terminology for such an exercise in soliciting information and feedback from affected communities. The term ‘beneficiary’ implies a passive recipient of charity. Particularly in an assessment of the engagement with local and national capacities, such nomenclature is inappropriate. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Jaffna is not included here, as the data for that district were not available at the time of writing. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)